2008
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-88961-8_14
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Practical Insecurity for Effective Steganalysis

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…We assume a computationally bounded adversary running in a polynomial time, incapable of breaking the encryption algorithm without knowing the key used for encryption; however, the adversary is capable of breaking a steganographic scheme in a limited time T (n) where n is the size of the image being used. This assumption is reasonable since most steganographic techniques have been broken by effective steganalysis given enough resources [1] while breaking advanced encryption algorithms (e.g., AES [5]) is computationally infeasible for even the most powerful supercomputers.…”
Section: Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…We assume a computationally bounded adversary running in a polynomial time, incapable of breaking the encryption algorithm without knowing the key used for encryption; however, the adversary is capable of breaking a steganographic scheme in a limited time T (n) where n is the size of the image being used. This assumption is reasonable since most steganographic techniques have been broken by effective steganalysis given enough resources [1] while breaking advanced encryption algorithms (e.g., AES [5]) is computationally infeasible for even the most powerful supercomputers.…”
Section: Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 98%