Practical verification of multi-agent systems against Slk specifications

Čermák, Petr; Lomuscio, Alessio; Mogavero, Fabio; Murano, Aniello

doi:10.1016/j.ic.2017.09.011

Cited by 19 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…For LTL[F ] model checking is in PSPACE (Almagor, Boker, and Kupferman 2016), and so is model checking SLK with memoryless agents (Cermák et al 2018). We show that it is also the case for SLK[F ], as long as the functions f ∈ F can be computed in polynomial space.…”

Section: Model Checkingmentioning

confidence: 92%

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Maubert

Mittelmann

Murano

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

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Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.

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Section: Model Checkingmentioning

confidence: 92%

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Maubert

Mittelmann

Murano

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

Self Cite

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“…To the best of our knowledge, there are only two other tools that can be used to reason about temporal logic equilibrium properties of concurrent/multi-agent systems: PRALINE [16] and MCMAS [19,20].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike other approaches to rational synthesis and temporal equilibrium analysis, e.g. [21,14,32,42], we employ parity games [29], which are an intuitively simple veri cation model with an abundant associated set of algorithmic solutions [33]. In particular, strategies in our framework, as in [42], can depend on players' actions, leading to a much richer game-theoretic se ing where Nash equilibrium is invariant under bisimilarity [38,39], a desirable property for concurrent and reactive systems [62,49,27,75].…”

Section: Automata and Logic In Computer Science A Common Technique mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…goals (e.g., reachability, safety, and others), but does not permit LTL goals, and does not compute bisimulation-invariant strategies.MCMAS is a model checking tool for multi-agent systems[60]. Since it can be used to model check Strategy Logic (SL[64]) formulae[20], and SL can express the existence of a Nash equilibrium, one can model a multi-agent system in MCMAS and check for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in such a system using SL. However, MC-MAS only supports SL with memoryless strategies (while our implementation does not have this restriction) and, as PRALINE, does not compute bisimulation-invariant strategies either.From the many di erences between PRALINE, MCMAS, and EVE (and their associated underlying reasoning and veri cation techniques), one of the most important ones is bisimulation-invariance, a feature needed to be able to do veri cation and synthesis, e.g., when using symbolic methods with OBDDs or some model-minimisation techniques.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Automated temporal equilibrium analysis: Verification and synthesis of multi-player games

Gutiérrez

Najib

Perelli

et al. 2020

Artificial Intelligence

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In the context of multi-agent systems, the rational veri cation problem is concerned with checking which temporal logic properties will hold in a system when its constituent agents are assumed to behave rationally and strategically in pursuit of individual objectives. Typically, those objectives are expressed as temporal logic formulae which the relevant agent desires to see satis ed. Unfortunately, rational veri cation is computationally complex, and requires specialised techniques in order to obtain practically useable implementations. In this paper, we present such a technique. is technique relies on a reduction of the rational veri cation problem to the solution of a collection of parity games. Our approach has been implemented in the Equilibrium V eri cation Environment (EVE) system. e EVE system takes as input a model of a concurrent/multi-agent system represented using the Simple Reactive Modules Language (SRML), where agent goals are represented as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae, together with a claim about the equilibrium behaviour of the system, also expressed as an LTL formula. EVE can then check whether the LTL claim holds on some (or every) computation of the system that could arise through agents choosing Nash equilibrium strategies; it can also check whether a system has a Nash equilibrium, and synthesise individual strategies for players in the multi-player game. A er

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“…A model checker for Strategy Logic with Knowledge for systems with memoryless strategies and incomplete information is introduced in (Cermák et al 2018). This tool is an extension of the model checker MCMAS, which has also been enhanced with verification of SL[1G] defined for systems with perfect recall and complete information (Cermák, Lomuscio, and Murano 2015).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Satisfiability Checking of Strategy Logic with Simple Goals

Kacprzak

Niewiadomski²,

Penczek

2021

Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

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In this paper, we introduce a new method of the satisfiability (SAT) checking for Simple-Goal Strategy Logic (SL[SG]), using symbolic Boolean model encoding and the SAT Modulo Monotonic Theories techniques, which was implemented into the tool SGSAT. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only tool solving the SAT problem for SL[SG]. Its applications include process synthesis, developing controllers as well as automatic planners in multi-agent scenarios.

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Practical verification of multi-agent systems against Slk specifications

Cited by 19 publications

References 28 publications

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Automated temporal equilibrium analysis: Verification and synthesis of multi-player games

Satisfiability Checking of Strategy Logic with Simple Goals

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