Practicing Feminisms, Reconstructing Psychology

O género na psicologia: uma história de desencontros e rupturas

“…De facto, ao transformar dimen sões de subjectividade em traços individuais, como diz Morawski (1994), esta visão da diferença remete para o plano individual e essa é a razão pela qual os estudos so bre o género reproduziram, segundo a autora, as mesmas fraquezas que os estudos sobre os sexos apresentavam anteriormente: dualismo, enviesamento reducionista, negligência das semelhanças entre os sexos e das variações internas aos grupos de sexo, para além de participarem para a ideia de uma falsa simetria. Além disso, tal como Carolyn Sherif dizia que os investigadores utilizavam a variável sexo sem saber o que era o sexo, também nos podemos interrogar sobre o que é a diferença.…”

Charlotte Wolff and Lesbian History: Reconfiguring Liminality in Exile

“…It could be argued that in this view there is a whiff of "conditional membership in the higher status group," although Turner acknowledges that negotiating two social worlds heightens marginal individuals' (self)awareness "and may produce from their ranks a disproportionately high number of writers, artists, and philosophers" (p. 233), thereby generating an interesting exchange of cultural production between the margins and the mainstream. Morawski (1994) emphasizes the most transformative aspects of Turner's conceptualization of liminality to (re)configure feminist psychology as "liminal science," to move beyond the stereotype of the oxymoron (psychology informed by a feminist agenda cannot be "real/objective science") or the sometimes unwarranted positioning of feminist psychology as "critical," which also casts it in a merely "reactive," fringe role, thereby confirming the normgiving power of the "traditional" paradigm. Morawski (1994) also draws on the work of feminist epistemologists such as Haraway (1988) and Harding (1986) who have shown that so-called objectivity has been conflated with only one kind of "subjectivity" and "situated knowledge"-the affluent, male, White, heterosexual perspective-while the "situated knowledge" of "marginal" people not belonging to these privileged social groups has consistently been ignored or actively elided by the "traditional" scientific paradigm.…”

“…Morawski (1994) emphasizes the most transformative aspects of Turner's conceptualization of liminality to (re)configure feminist psychology as "liminal science," to move beyond the stereotype of the oxymoron (psychology informed by a feminist agenda cannot be "real/objective science") or the sometimes unwarranted positioning of feminist psychology as "critical," which also casts it in a merely "reactive," fringe role, thereby confirming the normgiving power of the "traditional" paradigm. Morawski (1994) also draws on the work of feminist epistemologists such as Haraway (1988) and Harding (1986) who have shown that so-called objectivity has been conflated with only one kind of "subjectivity" and "situated knowledge"-the affluent, male, White, heterosexual perspective-while the "situated knowledge" of "marginal" people not belonging to these privileged social groups has consistently been ignored or actively elided by the "traditional" scientific paradigm. Morawski (1994) does not seem to follow Turner's (1974) distinction between "marginality" and "liminality" but focuses on the "betwixt between" quality common to both and on its transformative potential:…”

“…In her life and work she negotiated several liminal areas-from her gender presentation to her standing in the academic and scientific community (she was a Fellow of the British Psychological Society, to which she bequeathed her papers and the copyright to her work, but at the same time she was not an eminent psychologist), to her membership of sexual minority organizations (she conducted pioneering research on lesbianism and bisexuality, but some resented her connection with the psy-professions). In the spirit of Wolff's "liminality" as a strategy and creative zone, and along the lines indicated by Morawski (1994) as regards the transformative possibilities of feminist psychology as a liminal science, we argue for a reappraisal of Wolff's life and work that, in negotiating the borderlands between lesbian history and history of psychology, could enrich both disciplines. …”

“…Morawski (1994) also draws on the work of feminist epistemologists such as Haraway (1988) and Harding (1986) who have shown that so-called objectivity has been conflated with only one kind of "subjectivity" and "situated knowledge"-the affluent, male, White, heterosexual perspective-while the "situated knowledge" of "marginal" people not belonging to these privileged social groups has consistently been ignored or actively elided by the "traditional" scientific paradigm. Morawski (1994) does not seem to follow Turner's (1974) distinction between "marginality" and "liminality" but focuses on the "betwixt between" quality common to both and on its transformative potential:…”