Pre-Authorization: A Novel Decision-Making Heuristic That May Promote Autonomy

Abstract

While the nature of autonomy has been debated for centuries, recent scholarship has been re-examining our conception(s) of autonomy in light of findings from the behavioral, cognitive, and neural sciences (Felsen and Reiner 2011;Blumenthal-Barby 2016). Blumenthal-Barby's target article provides us with a timely and helpful framework for thinking about this issue in a systematic way, specifically in relation to the wide range of cognitive biases and heuristics that we employ in our decision making. Building on this, we wish to expand the framework beyond the article's focus on the threat posed by biases and heuristics by suggesting that it is possible for at least some heuristics to promote autonomy. We hope to demonstrate this point by introducing the conceptual framework for a novel heuristic that we call pre-authorization.Blumenthal-Barby argues that biases and heuristics "pose a serious threat to autonomous decision-making and human agency" and that, consequently, efforts should be made to remove, mitigate, or counter them. While recognizing the autonomy-threatening potential of these 'fast thinking' mechanisms, as well as agreeing with the author about the types of cases in which this potential is likely to be actualized, we suggest that it does not capture the full range of interactions that are relevant to a balanced assessment of their impact on autonomy. If, as is widely acknowledged, at least some heuristics are adaptive responses to particular real-world decision-making situations (Gigerenzer 2008), the issue at hand becomes elucidating whether, and under what conditions, the cognitive influence of any particular heuristic is autonomy-threatening, autonomy-preserving, or even autonomy-promoting. BlumenthalBarby focuses on the first of these categories; and, with respect to the component of absence of controlling or alienating influence, she contends that if the person's attitude towards the influence is one of feeling controlled or alienated from her decision on account of the workings of a cognitive bias or heuristic, her autonomy is diminished.We agree with Blumenthal-Barby's recognition that "the relevant question for judgements of autonomous action is the person's attitude towards the influence that is leading them towards one decision or action or another" (emphasis added). But what does it mean to have an attitude towards an influence? When an influence is entirely alienating or controlling, one can reasonably adopt an attitude of rejection, lest one's decisions be influenced unduly by forces that we deem inappropriate. But in navigating our lives, we sometimes welcome certain influences, and under those circumstances there seems to be little threat to meaningful autonomy. So what is different about the influence that is welcomed from the one that is resisted? We suggest one solution: that the extent to which the source of an influence is preauthorized critically determines how it affects autonomy. We have been studying this idea within the context of investigating the welcome or unwelcome nature...

Perceptions of Undue Influence Shed Light on the Folk Conception of Autonomy

“…In certain situations (such as in our healthy eating scenario), arational influences from a preauthorized source are perceived as less objectionable and more welcome than a rational influence from a non-preauthorized source. This finding highlights the relationship between conscious cognitive processes and control over one’s behavior in a way that supports our theoretical conception of preauthorization as “a process by which an individual gives a certain agent preferential access to influencing her decision-making processes” ( Niker et al, 2016 , p. 27). Whether we do so explicitly or as a form of tacit knowledge ( Cianciolo et al, 2006 ), we suggest that the act of preauthorization represents an adaptive cognitive process: the brain evaluates external agents and classifies them by how reliable their information may be.…”

“…It has already been well-established that our decisions are more readily influenced by agents with whom we (know we) share a worldview than by those with whom we do not ( Cohen, 2003 ; Kahan and Braman, 2006 ; Kahan, 2013 ). We have proposed that, at least in some cases, this results from our “preauthorizing” the former agents ( Niker et al, 2016 ). What is not yet known, and what we test here, is whether perceptions of the undueness of an influence depend on whether the influencer shares one’s worldview.…”

“…We suggest that these results support an understanding of preauthorization as an evaluative stance by which an actor gives a certain agent preferential access to influencing her decisions. Specifically, the agent’s influence is incorporated in relevant future interactions without needing to be consciously evaluated, and without impacting the actor’s perception of the control she has over the resultant decision ( Niker et al, 2016 ).…”