Predictive processing and anti-representationalism

Abstract

Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments these philosophers endorse, no structure within predictive processing systems can be rightfully identified as a representational vehicle. To do so, I first examine some of the theoretical commitments these philosophers share, and show that these commitments provide a set of necessary conditions the satisfaction of which allows us to identify representational vehicles. Having done so, I introduce a predictive processing system capable of active inference, in the form of a simple robotic "brain". I examine it thoroughly, and show that, given the necessary conditions highlighted above, none of its components qualifies as a representational vehicle. I then consider and allay some worries my claim could raise. I consider whether the anti-representationalist verdict thus obtained could be generalized, and provide some reasons favoring a positive answer. I further consider whether my arguments here could be blocked by allowing the same representational vehicle to possess multiple contents, and whether my arguments entail some extreme form of revisionism, answering in the negative in both cases. A quick conclusion follows.

Representationalism and rationality: why mental representation is real

“…A tall order, we think. Despite the variety of defenses for antirepresentationalism provided in various works (Chemero 2000;Degenaar and Myin 2014;Downey 2018;Facchin 2021;Garzón 2008;Hutto and Myin 2013;Kohár 2023;Orlandi 2014;Raja 2018;Van Gelder 1995) our argument challenges both its explanatory and ontological versions. We show that misrepresentation is important in explaining action failures, contradicting the main claim of explanatory anti-representationalism that content and vehicles of mental representations are explanatorily irrelevant.…”

Phenomenal transparency, cognitive extension, and predictive processing

“…This is important to notice, for it is currently unclear whether predictive processing posits representation. See (Williams 2017;Kiefer and Hohwy 2018) for representationalist readings, and (Downey 2018;Facchin 2021a) for anti-representationalist ones.…”

Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution

“…To determine whether NSRs are real, one just needs to peek inside the neurocognitive system and see whether NSRs -or, more accurately, NSRs-supporting vehicles 4 -can be found (cf. Bechtel 2008Bechtel , 2014Thomson & Piccinini 2018;Piccinini 2020a;Facchin 2021a). For simplicity, let me refer to NSRs supporting vehicles as NSRVs.…”

“…But see(Silberstein & Chemero 2013;Silberstein 2021) for a diverging opinion.2 Predictive Processing also admits non-representational interpretations which (sadly) remained quite marginal (seeDowney 2018;Facchin 2021a). …”