Preferences for redistribution—A country comparison of fairness judgements

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain within-and between-country variation in redistributive preferences in terms of self-interest concerns and an input-based concept of fairness, which we examine by looking at the effects of beliefs regarding the causes of income differences. Results of estimations based on data for 25 countries indicate that both factors are indeed important determinants of redistribution support, in line with hypothesised patterns. We find that while differences in beliefs on what causes income differences seem to be important for explaining within-country variation in redistributive preferences, they do little to explain between-country differences. Differences in the effects of holding certain beliefs, however, are important for explaining between-country variation in redistributive preferences, suggesting considerable heterogeneity across societies in what is considered as fair.JEL classification: D63, D31, D01

Comparing inequality aversion across countries when labor supply responses differ

“…4 Some studies elicit people's attitude towards inequality using survey data (see e.g. Fong, 2001, Corneo and Grüner, 2002, or Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009). Tax preferences obtained in surveys have also be compared with actual tax schedules (Singhal, 2008).…”

Social Mobility and Redistributive Taxation

“…Similar to the regression of e¤ort choices, the coe¢ cients 1 to 4 determine the voters' average preferred tax rate in case of w = 0, and 1 to 3 together with 1 to 3 capture the impact of the wage on the voters'choices. 16 More in detail, 1 estimates the average tax rate preferred by voters with a low wage in the Base treatment, and 2 ; 3 and 4 identify deviations for the other three treatments. The choices of the low-wage types in the Rand treatment are signi…cantly di¤erent from the Base treatment only if we consider all periods (compare 2 ).…”

“…In fact, here the preferred tax rate is a decreasing and convex function of the wage. 18 In the Mobi treatment, the impact of w it is signi…cantly negative only if we consider all periods (row 2 in Table 6), and there is no signi…cant 16 Since in the Igno treatment subjects don't know their wage when they choose the tax rate, the interaction terms with the wage are omitted. 17 In another estimation, we included the subjects'wage in the previous round (w i;t 1 ) interacted with treatment dummies into the estimation.…”

“…His research focuses on the role of beliefs about whether economic success is predetermined or whether individual e¤ort is more important for economic achievements for individuals' preferences on redistribution. See Isaksson and Lindskog (2009) for an international comparison. on redistribution takes place in an experimental laboratory and under ideal conditions.…”

Social divisions and institutions: assessing institutional parameter variation

“…In other words, if some segments of society feel, rightly or not, that the existing property rights institutions offer them no protection, then the effects of these institutions on economic behaviour should be less widespread. 8 Second, there might be a compliance effect; if citizens feel that the institutional framework does not protect their interests, 6 There are, for example, experimental and survey based evidence that when assessing the fairness of a distribution people take into account the inputs -such as effort, skills or luck -contributing to that distribution (see, for example, Hoffman and Spitzer 1985;Fong 2001;Cappelen et al 2007;and Isaksson and Lindskog 2009). If people believe that the prevailing distribution is based on factors under individual control, such as hard work, they may view it as just even though it is unequal, whereas if they believe it is based on factors outside individual control, such as political favoritism or inheritance, they may regard it as unjust.…”