Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience

Abstract

In a recent article, ‘Tensed Time and Our Differential Experience of the Past and Future,’ William Lane Craig (1999a) attempts to resuscitate A. N. Prior's (1959) ‘Thank Goodness’ argument against the B-theory by combining it with Plantinga's (1983) views about basic beliefs. In essence Craig's view is that since there is a universal experience and belief in the objectivity of tense and the reality of becoming, (that he identifies with ‘the presentist metaphysic’) ‘this belief constitutes an intrinsic defeater-defeater which overwhelms the objections brought against it.’ (1999a, 519) An intrinsic defeater-defeater is a belief that enjoys such warrant for us that it simply overwhelms the defeaters brought against it without specifically rebutting or undercutting them. Thus, Craig claims that an effete philosophical argument like McTaggart's paradox is nothing more than ‘an engaging and recalcitrant brain teaser whose conclusion nobody really takes seriously.’ (1999a, 532) It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Craig's own writings elsewhere. For Craig has vigorously argued in at least two other articles that 'hybrid A-B theorists like McCall, Schlesinger, and Smith [who give ontological status to both A-properties and B-relations] are in deep trouble’ (1998, 127) since they are all effectively refuted by McTaggart's Paradox (cf. Craig 1997). It is not Craig's inconsistency regarding the significance of McTaggart conundrum that I want to draw attention to, however. Rather I wish to raise a different issue.

A Theory of Presentism

“…The version of presentism I am about to propose meets these conditions. It also meets the challenges that some (e.g., Oaklander, 2002; throw down for presentism to tackle, namely how presentists can help themselves to the notion of earlier than without having to invoke real relata, and how presentism can distinguish the past from the future. It should also be attractive to those who see close analogies between time and modality, and who prefer ersatz theories of possible worlds (such as Adams's 1974) over genuine modal realism (such as Lewis's 1986), for the position I will defend is essentially this: all of us should agree that Socrates taught Plato, i.e., that the proposition that Socrates is teaching Plato was, at some time, true.…”

“…This allows presentists to have a time series related by 'earlier than' without being committed to the existence of real, or rather, concretely realised relata, something anathema to presentism. Ersatzer Presentism thus bypasses the problems that other presentists get into when they do not take such relations as basic, and try to define them in terms of tenses (see, e.g., Oaklander, 2002;Mellor, 2003, 236-7).…”

“…The versions of presentism proposed byBigelow (1996) andCraig (1997), which also pack all of their proposed truthmakers for past-and future-tensed statements into the present, are subject to such criticisms. SeeOaklander (2002) for specific criticisms of these versions of presentism, andOaklander (2003) for criticisms ofCraig's later (2000aCraig's later ( ), (2000b attempts at defending presentism.…”

What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time

“…For the distinction between tense realism and A-theory see (Percival 2002). 4 B-theorists include Le Poidevin (1996Poidevin ( , 1998, Le Poidevin and Mellor 1987), Mellor (1981Mellor ( , 1998, Oaklander (1991Oaklander ( , 1993Oaklander ( , 2002Oaklander ( , 2004, Quine (1960), Reichenbach (1947, Russell (1914Russell ( , 1940Russell ( , 1948, Smart (1949Smart ( , 1955, Smith (1993), Williams (1951). Not all B-theorists think of themselves as static theorists.…”

Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig

“…It would take us too far a field to evaluate the prospects for Craig’s theory of time in this paper. Suffice it to say, that in order for events or states of affairs to be successively actualized, they must come into exist one after another, but as I have argued in detail elsewhere (Oaklander, 2004a,b,c), on Craig’s metaphysics of presentism the existence of temporal relations does not have an adequate ontological foundation, and that, as a result, his account of time and becoming is subject to McTaggart’s paradox and must therefore be rejected.…”