Presentists may say goodbye to A-properties

Rasmussen, Joshua

doi:10.1093/analys/ans038

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…As to rendering it essential to A-theories that they are A-theories: it's hard to see what's at issue here or where the benefit is supposed to come from. For instance, not all presentists self-describe as A-theorists (see my 2012; Rasmussen 2012Rasmussen , 2015. This is because the A-theory is frequently defined as the view that there are A-properties-something that those presentists deny.…”

Section: Re-shaping Not Rejectingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Deasy 2017: 392) 22 Those who describe the A-theory in this way include, but are not restricted to: Markosian (2010), Rasmussen (2012Rasmussen ( , 2016, Smart (2008), Tallant (2012), and Zimmerman (2008) Presentism Remains 427…”

Section: Re-shaping Not Rejectingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Merricks (2007: 125) offers the closely related analysis of 'existing at the present time' as 'existing', which will serve as analysis of 'being present' so long as 'existing at the present time' is read as equivalent to 'being present'-as sounds reasonable. I think that it's plausible to see both Correia and Rosencrantz (2015) and Rasmussen (2012Rasmussen ( , 2015 as offering reductive accounts of presence. To that extent, they can be seen as following in Crisp's (2007: 98, 102-5) shoes, where he looks to offer such a reductive analysis of the A-properties, including being present.…”

Section: Re-shaping the Debate Not Positionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Presentism Remains

Tallant

2017

Erkenn

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Section: Re-shaping Not Rejectingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Re-shaping Not Rejectingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Re-shaping the Debate Not Positionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Presentism Remains

Tallant

2017

Erkenn

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“…Given that the definition of 'instant-proposition' involves the tense operators 'P' ('It was the case that') and 'F' ('It will be the case that'), TAP does not provide the basis for a reductive analysis of the tense operators. Therefore, Presentists who accept TAP must still hold that some tense operators (or more precisely, the properties of propositions that they express) are fundamental Rasmussen (2012). argues that Presentists who accept TAP can at least provide a reductive analysis of the 'A-properties', that is, the properties of times of being past, being present and being future; see Tallant (2012) for a response.5 This may seem odd, but remember that given TAP, times are propositions.6 Presentists who accept TAP do not have to accept all of these definitions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Presentism and times as propositions

Banfi

Deasy

2021

Philos Stud

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Some Presentists—according to whom everything is present—identify instants of time with propositions of a certain kind. However, the view that times are propositions seems to be at odds with Presentism: if there are times then there are past times, and therefore things that are past; but how could there be things that are past if everything is present? In this paper, we describe the Presentist view that times are propositions (Sect. 2); we set out the argument that Presentism is incompatible with the view that times are propositions (Sect. 3); and then we describe three possible responses to that argument on behalf of Presentists who identify times with propositions (Sect. 4). We argue that each of these responses comes with significant costs. Finally, we describe a fourth possible response—according to which times are irreducibly higher-order entities—which appears to avoid the costs of the other three (Sect. 5). We also describe and respond to two objections to the higher-order strategy (Sect. 6).

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“…The problem derives from an 11 Defenses of this view can be found in Markosian [10] and Zimmerman [20], and in a number of books and papers.See also [3][4][5]. Rasmussen [16], nevertheless, thinks that Presentism is compatible with a tenseless theory of time by contradicting one of the principles of A-theory and reducing the A-properties (or determinations) to facts about B-relations. This is something that McTaggart himself rejects in his paper.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Presentism, Non-presentism and the Possibility of Time Travel

Colomina

Chico

2015

Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics

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This chapter argues for a notion of time that allows time travel. In order to time traveling to happen, in contrast to Presentism, the chapter demonstrates that we can change the past and we have some place where to travel. It shows the advantages of a non-presentist ontology that advocates for indeterminacy of future facts based not on its absence of truth-value, but on the overdetermination of future facts. The conclusion is that to break the causal chain is impossible in we are placed in the same causal line. But if we rethink the time traveling as a trans-world traveling, it is possible to open a new causal line anytime that someone travel in time, to the past as well as to the future.Even if some time soon our physicists find that the laws of physics support time travel, it might nonetheless never occur because, say, it will never be technologically feasible. Moreover, problems connected to time travel are not just empirically motivated, but they are also metaphysically and logically driven. In such a way that even those who see how deep and serious these problems are must admit that the existence of scenarios in which time travel is a possibility, it brings light over questions such as the nature and the topology of time, the time-asymmetry of causation, of backward causation, and some others.

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Presentists may say goodbye to A-properties

Cited by 18 publications

References 5 publications

Presentism Remains

Presentism Remains

Presentism and times as propositions

Presentism, Non-presentism and the Possibility of Time Travel

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