President Clinton's Intervention Into Bosnia, 1995

Abstract

This article analyzes Clinton's decision to intervene in Bosnia in 1995. The methodology used is a historical analysis of primary and secondary source material and an interpretation of that material. The available evidence shows that after not intervening in Rwanda, Clinton evolved toward a more assertive foreign policy. Clinton eventually fought against pressures to employ a containment strategy in Bosnia, pushed to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, and strike at the Bosnian Serbs. After multiple failed attempts at diplomacy to accomplish these goals, Clinton managed to achieve his objectives through indirect methods. He set the stage for a major military offensive against Bosnian Serb forces before the massacre at Srebrenica, which is an important correction to the traditional narrative on the topic. Clinton then initiated a massive U.S.-led bombing campaign, achieved military objectives, negotiated a peace agreement, and deployed U.S. troops to enforce the peace agreement.

Note From the Editor

“…Contrary to literature focusing on humanitarian norms or geopolitical interests as drivers of humanitarian intervention, Kushi (2023) argues that the Kosovo Crisis “earned” a NATO military intervention due to shifting conflict perceptions encouraging Western institutional involvement—a point she argues may well apply to other global crises. As an excellent counterpoint, Szandzik (2023) provides an in-depth discussion of the factors surrounding President Clinton's decision to intervene in Bosnia in 1995 and the importance that humanitarian concerns, as well as others, played in that decision. Staying with the topic of security, Ameyaw-Brobbey and Amable (2023) propose a detailed theoretical framework of “symmetric interest” to assess China-Kazakhstan relations from a non-external security perspective, while Ramachandran (2023) looks at the varied impacts of pursuing the China model in Sino-Sri Lankan bilateral relations.…”