This research analyzes Clinton's decision to not intervene in the Rwandan genocide. The methodology used is a historical analysis and interpretation of primary and secondary source material. Clinton admitted that not intervening in the Rwandan genocide was one of the greatest regrets of his presidency. There was not a substantial amount of domestic support for an intervention into Rwanda and Clinton did not attempt to use his influence to change that disposition. Clinton did not attempt to change domestic sentiments due to his priorities of reduced funding for foreign operations and the avoidance of ‘mission creep.’ The most common fault in the current historiography is the claim that Clinton did not intervene in Rwanda because of the failed mission that had recently occurred in Somalia, which does not align with the available evidence. Upon leaving office, he accepted ownership of his poor decisions and expressed sincere regret.

This article analyzes Clinton's decision to intervene in Bosnia in 1995. The methodology used is a historical analysis of primary and secondary source material and an interpretation of that material. The available evidence shows that after not intervening in Rwanda, Clinton evolved toward a more assertive foreign policy. Clinton eventually fought against pressures to employ a containment strategy in Bosnia, pushed to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, and strike at the Bosnian Serbs. After multiple failed attempts at diplomacy to accomplish these goals, Clinton managed to achieve his objectives through indirect methods. He set the stage for a major military offensive against Bosnian Serb forces before the massacre at Srebrenica, which is an important correction to the traditional narrative on the topic. Clinton then initiated a massive U.S.-led bombing campaign, achieved military objectives, negotiated a peace agreement, and deployed U.S. troops to enforce the peace agreement.