Pretending to be States: The Use of Facebook by Armed Groups in Myanmar

Abstract

Which functions do social media fill for non-state armed groups in countries with internal armed conflict? Building on conflict data, interviews and media monitoring, we have reviewed the use of social media by Myanmar's nine most powerful armed groups. The first finding is that they act like states, using social media primarily to communicate with their constituents. Second, they also use social media as a tool of armed struggle, for command and control, intelligence, denunciation of traitors, and attacks against adversaries. Third, social media serves for national and international outreach. Like Myanmar's national army, the armed groups have combined prudent official pages with an underworld of more reckless profiles and closed groups that often breach Facebook's official community standards. In February 2019, when Facebook excluded four groups from its platform, they lost much of their ability to reach out and act like states. Yet they kept a capacity to communicate with their constituents through closed groups, individual profiles and sophisticated use of links and shares. Finally, the article affirms that the Facebook company, in the years 2018-2020,took upon itself a role as an arbiter within Myanmar's internal conflicts, deciding what information was allowed and disallowed.

Small farmers, big tech: agrarian commerce and knowledge on Myanmar Facebook

“…Such infamy prompted a shift in corporate policy, including hiring Myanmar-speaking content moderators, bringing on national advisors, and building dedicated country and regional expertise in the Singapore office. In the shadow of scandal, the platform’s public, interactive, and mobile-friendly features became critical to a wide range of domestic activities, from state-building to cultural preservation to online shopping (The-Thitsar 2021 ; Frydenlund and Shunn Lei 2021 ; Tønnesson 2022 ). For small farmers like the ones I lived and worked with, cheap SIM cards meant new forms of exchange and connection; rural people harnessed Facebook for securing livelihoods, supporting community and mobilizing for land justice.…”

Cities under fire: Crisis communication on home front versus frontline cities' Facebook pages during operation ‘guardian of the walls’

“…Furthermore, social media platforms can provide government agencies and decision-makers with the most up-to-date citizen sentiment regarding a developing crisis and assist them in creating a proper response and acting accordingly (Dong et al, 2021;Tagliacozzo, 2018;Zhou et al, 2018). This practice is especially relevant in natural disasters such as floods (Rossi et al, 2018), hurricanes (Yang & Stewart, 2019) or earthquakes when there is a combined need for preparedness, rescue and relief efforts (L. Li et al, 2018;Pourebrahim et al, 2019;Scott & Errett, 2018;Taylor et al, 2023). Previous studies have demonstrated that even though news outlets play a key role in the diffusion of information regarding these types of crises online (Kim et al, 2018), government agencies still have the ability to control the narrative and the messages disseminated to citizens to raise awareness towards them (Branicki & Agyei, 2015;Criado et al, 2020).…”

“…Although many studies have focused on specific terrorist incidents, as in the aforementioned two examples, the research mostly overlook extensive events of military operations and armed conflicts and the role of local government bodies in social media. Thus, most of the relevant literature deals with national governments' efforts to advocate and represent their side of the conflict to different crowds and countries (Bahar, 2020; Manor & Crilley, 2018; Tønnesson et al, 2022). This is also the case for the ongoing armed conflict between Israel and the armed forces in Gaza, mostly Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.…”

Types of Communications Technology and Civil Conflict

“…In another setting, mobile phones helped the Libyan Rebels avoid communication surveillance and obstruction dur-ing their fight against Gaddafi (Hill, 2011). Other examples include the use of Facebook and satellite phones by the Arakan Army rebel group in 2018-2020 in their fight against the National Army of Myanmar and the use of social media platforms by Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and ISIS to radicalize and recruit followers, coordinate activities, and secure funding (Cox et al, 2018;Tønnesson et al, 2021).…”