Preventing Denial-of-Service Attacks in Shared CMP Caches

Κεραμίδας, Γεώργιος; Petoumenos, Pavlos; Αντωνόπουλος, Αλέξανδρος; Serpanos, Dimitrios

doi:10.1007/11796435_37

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Many subsequent papers proposed various fair memory scheduling algorithms in DRAM controllers [21], [29], [30], [36]. Keramidas et al studied DoS attacks on cache space and proposed a cache replacement policy that allocates less space to such attackers (or cache "hungry" threads) [15]. Woo et al investigated DoS attacks on cache bus (between L1 and L2) bandwidth, main memory bus (frontside bus) bandwidth, and shared cache space, on a simulated multicore platform [45].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Denial-of-Service Attacks on Shared Cache in Multicore: Analysis and Prevention

Bechtel

Yun

2019

2019 IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we investigate the feasibility of denialof-service (DoS) attacks on shared caches in multicore platforms. With carefully engineered attacker tasks, we are able to cause more than 300X execution time increases on a victim task running on a dedicated core on a popular embedded multicore platform, regardless of whether we partition its shared cache or not. Based on careful experimentation on real and simulated multicore platforms, we identify an internal hardware structure of a nonblocking cache, namely the cache writeback buffer, as a potential target of shared cache DoS attacks. We propose an OS-level solution to prevent such DoS attacks by extending a state-of-theart memory bandwidth regulation mechanism. We implement the proposed mechanism in Linux on a real multicore platform and show its effectiveness in protecting against cache DoS attacks.

show abstract