Preventive reinforcement under uncertainty for islanded microgrids with electricity and natural gas networks

Abstract

This paper presents an approach to determine the vulnerable components in the electricity and natural gas networks of an islanded microgrid that is exposed to deliberate disruptions. The vulnerable components in the microgrid are identified by solving a bi-level optimization problem. The objective of the upper-level problem (the attacker's objective) is to maximize the expected operation cost of microgrid by capturing the penalties associated with the curtailed electricity and heat demands as a result of the disruption. In the lower-level problem, the adverse effects of disruptions and outages in the electricity and natural gas networks are mitigated by leveraging the available resources in the microgrid (the defender's objective). The uncertainties in the electricity and heat demand profiles were captured by introducing scenarios with certain probabilities. The formulated bi-level optimization problem provides effective guidelines for the microgrid operator to adopt the reinforcement strategies in the interdependent natural gas and electricity distribution networks and improve the resilience of energy supply. The presented case study shows that as more components are reinforced in the interdependent energy networks, the reinforcement cost is increased and the expected operation cost as a result of disruption is decreased.

Resiliency constraint proactive scheduling against hurricane in multiple energy carrier microgrid

“…Data that supportthe findings of this study are available in references [20, 21] and the authors are avaliable to response other data inquiries if needed.…”

“…The initial volume of gasoline storage in energy hubs 1, 2 and 3 are 1000, 500 and 1000 L, respectively. The values of electrical and gas network parameters have been presented in [20,21]. The heat network parameters are given in Table 4.…”

“…In [14][15][16][17] and [23], it has been assumed that HR event is caused to damage the infrastructure of the upstream networks and the HR event has been modelled as the sudden islanding of MGs from the upstream networks. But in a number of others, the problem of resilience has been considered assuming the large scale of the MG and the vulnerability of its components against HR event [18][19][20][21]. In this paper, the effect of an HR event is modelled as the sudden islanding of MECM from upstream electricity and gas networks.…”

“…However, the normal operation uncertainties of the problem are not considered in these articles. The resilience of MECM under interruption of by electricity and gas networks has been studied in [20] and [21], and a bi-level optimization problem has been formulated to ensure the resilience performance of combined gas and electricity networks. In these studies, a level of resilience in the operation mode has been sure identifying the vulnerable components and reinforcing them.…”

Coordinated Operation and Planning of Integrated Electricity and Gas Community Energy System With Enhanced Operational Resilience

“…Due to the restriction of roof area, the maximum capacity of the PV system is 1000 kWp. The critical percentages of the cooling, heating and electricity loads are 80%, 80% and 70%, respectively; similarly, penalty costs of the curtailed cooling, heating and electricity loads are 60 CNY/kWh, 60 CNY/kWh and 100 CNY/kWh, respectively, [39]. The outage durations of the electricity and natural gas supply are 2 hours and 4 hours.…”