Price control and privatization in a mixed duopoly with a public social enterprise

Chang, Chih Wei; Wu, Dachrahn; Lin, Yan Shu

doi:10.1007/s00712-017-0564-2

Cited by 13 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…5 These studies are all conducted within a horizontal di¤erentiation (Hotelling) framework. 6 More recent studies of mixed duopoly quality competition with …xed prices have addressed issues such as soft budgets (Levaggi and Monte…ori, 2013), partial privatization policies (Chang et al, 2018) and location choices (Hehenkamp and Kaarbøe, 2020). A broader review of the merits of mixed markets in health care, presented in a uni…ed framework, is given by Levaggi and Levaggi (2020).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal funding coverage in a mixed oligopoly with quality competition and price regulation

Ghandour

Straume

2022

J Econ

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We study the optimal design of a public funding scheme in a mixed oligopoly setting (with applications to health care and education) with one welfare-maximising public provider and two pro…t-maximising private providers, where all providers compete on quality and where providers included in the public funding scheme are subject to price regulation. We …nd that the …rst-best solution cannot be implemented without including (at least) one of the private providers in the public funding scheme. However, inclusion of only one of the private providers is su¢ cient to induce the …rst-best outcome. Such inclusion allows for the elimination of a negative competition externality between the private providers that, all else equal, yields underprovision of quality.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 This incentive for underprovision of quality is caused by the assumed sequentiality of quality and price decisions, as shown byMa and Burgess (1993).…”

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confidence: 99%

Optimal funding coverage in a mixed oligopoly with quality competition and price regulation

Ghandour

Straume

2022

J Econ

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“…Kuo (2022) also adopts a similar setup, where the objective function of foreign exporting firms in the study includes not only their own profit levels but also the consumer surplus in the importing country. Chang et al (2018) assume that public social enterprises' objective function consists of social welfare and the profit level of public firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing ad valorem and specific taxes with corporate social responsibility

Hsiao,

Glen Ueng,

Peng

et al. 2024

J Public Economic Theory

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This paper examines the welfare ranking of indirect tax systems with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly. Findings show that the two firms' cost and CSR asymmetries both play important roles. If the cost‐efficient firm has a higher CSR level, the standard result in traditional tax theory is sustainable. Namely, ad valorem tax (specific subsidy) policies are considered superior to specific tax (ad valorem subsidy) policies. However, if the cost‐inefficient firm has a significantly higher CSR level, the standard result is reversed. This result remains robust in an oligopoly model or under a tax revenue constraint.

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“…Thus, partial privatization is not always optimal, implying that either complete privatization or nationalization may also be optimal. Chang et al (2018) believe that the optimal privatization level is related to price regulation. Wang and Chen (2011) examine the impact of foreign penetration on the privatization of a mixed oligopoly market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal nationalization policy in a heterogeneous mixed oligopoly

Chen

Sun

et al. 2022

Manage Decis Econ

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This study constructs a mixed oligopoly model considering product differentiation, the proportion of state‐owned shares, the efficiency gap, and the reform cost, investigates market equilibrium under different competition modes, and discusses the optimal proportion of state‐owned shares. Product differentiation, the proportion of state‐owned shares, and reform costs have complex impacts on the equilibrium results. Complete, partial, and no nationalization may be optimal under certain conditions. The competition mode affects welfare distribution among stakeholders. The government should decide on an optimal nationalization policy according to specific conditions and the market environment.

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Price control and privatization in a mixed duopoly with a public social enterprise

Cited by 13 publications

References 17 publications

Optimal funding coverage in a mixed oligopoly with quality competition and price regulation

Optimal funding coverage in a mixed oligopoly with quality competition and price regulation

Comparing ad valorem and specific taxes with corporate social responsibility

Optimal nationalization policy in a heterogeneous mixed oligopoly

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