Pricing Analysis in Geo/Geo/1 Queueing System

Abstract

This paper studies the equilibrium behavior of customers and optimal pricing strategies of servers in a Geo/Geo/1 queueing system. Two common pricing mechanisms are considered. The first one is called ex-post payment (EPP) scheme where the server collects tolls proportional to queue times, and the second one is called ex-ante payment (EAP) scheme where the server charges a flat fee for the total service. The server sets the toll price to maximize its own profit. It is found that, under a customer’s choice equilibrium, the two toll mechanisms are equivalent from the economic point of view. Finally, we present several numerical experiments to investigate the effects of system parameters on the equilibrium customer joining rate and servers’ profits.

Effect of information on the strategic behavior of customers in a discrete-time bulk service queue

“…Hence, ∆ us (f ) is strictly concave in [0, 1] and has a unique global maximum, say f * ∈ [0, 1]. When all customers follow the same strategy, the socially optimal joining strategy, f s can be calculated from (16) under the following policies. Case 1.…”

“…A complete study on discrete-time queueing models has been presented in [11]. Although the literature on equilibrium analysis of discrete-time queues with strategic customers is very less in compared to their continuous-time counterparts, there are some well known studies in several directions such as vacations [15,23,14,7], breakdowns and repairs [25], pricing [16], comparison of information policies [8] etc.…”

Social Optimization and Pricing Strategies in Unobservable Queues with Delayed Multiple Vacations

“…Under EPP scheme, the server imposes a price proportional to sojourn time after completing service, while under EAP scheme the server charges a fee before offering service. Ma and Liu [20] observed customers' equilibrium behavior and optimal pricing strategies in a discrete-time queue under EPP and EAP schemes. Doo ho Lee [21] dealt with optimal pricing strategies in almost and fully unobservable queues with negative customers.…”

Optimal Pricing Strategies and Customers’ Equilibrium Behavior in an Unobservable M/M/1 Queueing System with Negative Customers and Repair

“…Later, Sun et al [27] extended this analysis to a batch arrival queueing system, and Economou and Kanta [28], Wang and Zhang [29], and Zhang et al [30] studied retrial cases. Recently, Ma and Liu [31] considered pricing strategies in a discrete-time Geo/Geo/1 queueing system, and Lee [32] studied the optimal pricing strategies in a discrete-time Geo/Geo/1 queuing system under the EPP and EAP schemes by assuming the sojourn timedependent reward.…”