Priming of mental operations by masked stimuli

Mattler, Uwe

doi:10.3758/bf03194793

Cited by 115 publications

(215 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Even if the priming effect reported by Mattler (2003), 45 ms, is more similar to our own, the difference in relation to the effect found by Lau and Passingham is important. The first explanation for it could be that in Lau and Passingham study participants were not completely unaware of the presentation of the prime since their d' measurements were higher than ours.…”

Section: < Insert Figure 4 About Here >contrasting

confidence: 61%

“…In contrast, the time between the onset of the prime and the onset of the instruction increased from 36 ms to 84 ms between Experiments 1 and 2. Mattler (2003) showed that priming of cognitive control operations did not occur when the prime-cue SOA was set at 34 ms or 51 ms but increased linearly when the SOA increased from 68 ms to 119 ms. Taken together, these findings suggest the time interval between the prime and the task cue has to be long enough to allow a task set priming. This interpretation is also consistent with the results obtained by Lau and Passingham, which showed no task set priming effect when the prime was consciously perceived but the delay between the prime and the instruction was as short as 16 ms.…”

Section: < Insert Figure 4 About Here >mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another set of studies has addressed the activation of task sets by masked stimuli that do not reach consciousness (Lau & Passingham, 2007;Mattler, 2003;Reuss, Kiesel, Kunde, & Hommel, 2011). The concept of task set assumes we can adopt a particular configuration of our cognitive system to perform a given task (Rogers & Monsell, 1995).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks

Weibel

Giersch

Dehaene

et al. 2013

Consciousness and Cognition

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To cite this version:Sébastien Weibel, Anne Giersch, Stanislas Dehaene, Caroline Huron. Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks.. Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2013, 22 (2) AbstractWhether unconscious stimuli can modulate the preparation of a cognitive task is still controversial. Using a backward masking paradigm, we investigated whether the modulation could be observed even if the prime was made unconscious in 100% of the trials. In two behavioral experiments, subjects were instructed to initiate a phonological or semantic task on an upcoming word, following an explicit instruction and an unconscious prime. When the SOA between prime and instruction was sufficiently long (84 ms), primes congruent with the task set instruction led to speedier responses than incongruent primes. In the other condition (36 ms), no task set priming was observed. Repetition priming had the opposite tendency, suggesting the observed task set facilitation cannot be ascribed solely to perceptual repetition priming. Our results therefore confirm that unconscious information can modulate cognitive control for currently active task sets, providing sufficient time is available before the conscious decision.

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Section: < Insert Figure 4 About Here >contrasting

confidence: 61%

Section: < Insert Figure 4 About Here >mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks

Weibel

Giersch

Dehaene

et al. 2013

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…However, the extent to which higher level cognitive functions (e.g., task preparation, cognitive control) are also influenced by unconscious information remains debated (Hommel, 2007;Mayr, 2004;Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003;Libet, 1999;Umilta, 1988). Interestingly, some recent studies have shown that even high-level cognitive processes, such as decision making (Pessiglione et al, 2008), reward prediction (Pessiglione et al, 2007), and task preparation (Lau & Passingham, 2007;Mattler, 2003), can be influenced unconsciously. These recent findings stress the contribution of unconscious processes in shaping everyday, but rather complex, behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dissociable Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Conscious and Unconscious Control of Behavior

Gaal¹,

Lamme²,

Fahrenfort³

et al. 2011

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

108

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General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. Thus, the N2 likely reflects the initiation of inhibitory control, irrespective of conscious awareness. The P3 component was much reduced in amplitude and duration on masked versus unmasked stop trials. These patterns of differences and similarities between conscious and unconscious cognitive control processes are discussed in a framework that differentiates between feedforward and feedback connections in yielding conscious experience.

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“…However, several studies demonstrated that task goals can also be activated automatically by information in the environment (e.g. Mattler, 2003;Mayr & Bryck, 2007;Verbruggen & Logan, 2009) or by the retrieval of previously formed associations between a stimulus and a particular goal (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2008;Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003).…”

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confidence: 99%

A multi-modal approach to the study of attachment-related distress

Dewitte

Houwer

Goubert

et al. 2010

Biological Psychology

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The present study investigated the relative contribution of bottom-up and top-down control to task selection in the voluntary task switching (VTS) procedure. In order to manipulate the efficiency of top-down control, a concurrent working-memory load was imposed during VTS. In three experiments bottom-up factors such as stimulus repetitions, repetition of irrelevant information and stimulus-task associations were introduced to investigate their influence on task selection. We observed that the tendency to repeat tasks was stronger under load, suggesting that top-down control counteracts the automatic tendency to repeat tasks. The results also indicated that task selection can be guided by several elements in the environment, but that only the influence of stimulus repetitions depend on the efficiency of top-down control. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed within the interplay between top-down and bottom-up control that underlies the voluntary selection of tasks. R596BVoluntary task switching under load 3Many researchers assume that goal-directed behavior relies on the intentional and controlled activation of task goals (Baddeley, 1992;Logan & Gordon, 2001;Miller & Cohen, 2001). However, several studies demonstrated that task goals can also be activated automatically by information in the environment (e.g. Mattler, 2003;Mayr & Bryck, 2007;Verbruggen & Logan, 2009) or by the retrieval of previously formed associations between a stimulus and a particular goal (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2008;Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003). In the present study we examined the contribution of top-down and bottom-up activation of task goals in voluntary task switching (VTS).In VTS, subjects switch between cognitive tasks. They are free to select the task to perform, as long as each task is selected an approximate equal number of times and subjects do not follow a predictable pattern of task selections (Arrington, 2008;Arrington & Logan, 2004;2005;Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2009;Mayr & Bell, 2006). A general finding is that subjects repeat tasks more often than they switch (Arrington & Logan, 2005). This task-repetition bias has been linked to the efficiency of top-down control processes involved in the voluntary selection of task goals. For example, Mayr and Bell (2006) argued that subjects tend to repeat tasks because the task of the previous trial is still the most active one when selecting a new task. In order to overcome this bias, the activated task has to be inhibited. Thus, selection of tasks would depend on top-down control processes (see also Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005. However, several studies showed that bottomup processes also contribute to task selection in VTS (e.g. Arrington, 2008) and Mayr and Bell (2006) observed that the task-repetition bias was stronger when the stimulus of the previous trial was repeated compared to when the stimulus alternated. This stimulus-repetition effect suggests that voluntary task selection is not completely immune to bottom-up priming effects....

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Priming of mental operations by masked stimuli

Cited by 115 publications

References 43 publications

Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks

Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks

Dissociable Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Conscious and Unconscious Control of Behavior

A multi-modal approach to the study of attachment-related distress

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