Primitiveness, Metaontology, and Explanatory Power

Abstract

Metaphysical theories heavily rely on the use of primitives to which they typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some traditional well-known theories and I will discuss the role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. I will then turn to a discussion of claims of 'equivalence' between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the nature of primitives. I will then claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their primitives, and so I will turn to scrutinize the notion of 'power' and 'explanatory Among central points of discussion in metaontology are claims of 'equivalence' between allegedly competing theories 1 . In this paper, I want to explore some general reasons there are for such claims, and see what can be learned from them. I believe that a lot in this metaontological debate, and in metaphysical debates in general, relies heavily on the use and the nature of primitives to which theories typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some clearly non-equivalent theories and, in §2, I shall discuss the role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. In §5-6, I will then turn to a discussion of claims of equivalence between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the role and the nature of primitives in general. By doing this, I will emphasize the utmost importance of primitives in the construction of metaphysical theories and in the subsequent evaluation of them. In §7-8, I will claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their primitives, and I will then scrutinize the notion of "power" and "explanatory". Together, these points will naturally lead me to defend a global view on the nature of the

Are All Primitives Created Equal?

“…For example, and as has been discussed extensively in Benovsky's work (, ), take the debate about attribute agreement in metaphysics. The central question is “How is it possible that two objects share the same property?” The debate is highly complex but let us focus on three possible solutions.…”

“…The primitives in all three theories play a central role in providing an answer to the original question of when it is the case that two objects share the same property. This kind of primitive is what Benovsky calls a “problem‐solver” (, 344). Without these primitives, each of the theories would not be able to solve the original problem.…”

“…A further distinction that is relevant to comparing primitives comes from Benovsky (). This concerns the role and nature of the primitive within our theories.…”

“…Such primitives are introduced with little (or even no) comment as to the specific nature of the primitive itself. Their nature remains something like a Lockean “we‐know‐not‐what,” and they are introduced instead just as a “we‐do‐know‐what‐they‐do” (Benovsky , 345). The nature of the primitive remains a mystery, but we get a grip on the primitive through the functional role it plays.…”

“…After introducing the notion of a primitive posit, I discuss the different kinds of primitives that we might posit. Following Cowling (), I distinguish between ontological and ideological primitives, and, following Benovsky (), between functional and content views of primitives. I then propose that these two distinctions cut across each other leading to four types of primitive posits.…”