In this paper,

In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of 'equivalent' to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps: first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard objections and arguing for a tu quoque in all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical purposes. I then examine two different versions of the bundle theory with universals, and show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the substratum theory with universals, by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles in a completely parallel way. It is only the second, quite extreme and puzzling, version of the bundle theory with universals that is not equivalent to any other view; and the diagnosis of why this is so will show just how unpalatable the view is. Similarly, only a not-so-palatable version of the substratum theory is genuinely different from the other views; and here again it's precisely what makes it different that makes it less appealing.Keywords Bundles Á Substrata Á Substratum Á Bundle theory Á Substratum theory Á Metaphysical equivalence Á Identity of indiscernibles 1 The substratum theory and the bundle theory: deadly enemiesThe substratum theory (also called 'the substance-attribute view') can be put as a claim about what the relationship between a particular and its properties is: there are

Metaphysical theories heavily rely on the use of primitives to which they typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some traditional well-known theories and I will discuss the role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. I will then turn to a discussion of claims of 'equivalence' between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the nature of primitives. I will then claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their primitives, and so I will turn to scrutinize the notion of 'power' and 'explanatory Among central points of discussion in metaontology are claims of 'equivalence' between allegedly competing theories 1 . In this paper, I want to explore some general reasons there are for such claims, and see what can be learned from them. I believe that a lot in this metaontological debate, and in metaphysical debates in general, relies heavily on the use and the nature of primitives to which theories typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some clearly non-equivalent theories and, in §2, I shall discuss the role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. In §5-6, I will then turn to a discussion of claims of equivalence between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the role and the nature of primitives in general. By doing this, I will emphasize the utmost importance of primitives in the construction of metaphysical theories and in the subsequent evaluation of them. In §7-8, I will claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their primitives, and I will then scrutinize the notion of "power" and "explanatory". Together, these points will naturally lead me to defend a global view on the nature of the

Metaphysical theories are often counter-intuitive. But they also often are strongly supported and motivated by intuitions. One way or another, the link between intuitions and metaphysics is a strong and important one, and there is hardly any metaphysical discussion where intuitions do not play a crucial role. In this article, I will be interested in a particular kind of such intuitions, namely those that come, at least partly, from experience. There seems to be a route from experience to metaphysics, and this is the core of my interest here. In order to better understand such 'arguments from experience' and the kind of relationship there is between this type of intuitions and metaphysical theories, I shall examine four particular cases where a kind of experience-based intuition seems to motivate or support a metaphysical theory. At the end of the day, I shall argue that this route is a treacherous one, and that in all of the four cases I shall concentrate on, phenomenological considerations are in fact orthogonal to the allegedly 'corresponding' metaphysical claims. An anti-realist view of metaphysics will emerge. §1.Metaphysical theories are often counter-intuitive. Some tell us that there are weird material macroscopic objects, like an object made up from the top half of the Eiffel Tower, the north face of Everest, the last living polar bear, and Socrates' nose. Others tell us that time does not pass and that ordinary objects-including ourselves-do not persist through time, or for that matter, that time does not exist and ordinary objects-including ourselves-do not exist. Some claim that there is no universe around us at all and that the world we seem to be living in is actually akin to a dream. Yet others tell us that not only our universe, time, us, and weird macroscopic objects do exist, but that so do infinitely many other counterpart universes, as real as our own.When facing such strong and striking claims, as a metaphysician, one may wish to react in various ways. One may want to reject these claims (or, at least, incredulously stare at them). More daringly, one may want to reject one's intuitions that these claims violate. Or, one may try to show that these claims actually do not violate any (real and good) intuitions. Alternatively, one may also try to show that one's C 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of 'empty time' and 'time without change'. As we shall see, the two allegedly very different rival views are much less different than has been thought: their structure is extremely similar, their strategies are extremely similar, and they can both face the possibilities of 'empty time' and 'time without change' in the same way. Thus, I argue in favour of a certain kind of equivalence between the two views; I discuss a Strong and a Weak version of this claim; and I provide reasons for endorsing the former. I also discuss the parallel between this pair of views about the nature of time and another analogous pair of views: the bundle theory and the substratum theory about the nature of material objects, with respect to the problem with Identity of Indiscernibles. 1.A useful and standard way to introduce the substantivalist theory of time is by the use of 'the container' metaphor and the two central arguments in its favour: the possibility of 'empty time' and the possibility of 'time without change'. According to substantivalism, time is like a container in which events and things are placed, a container that exists independently of what is placed in it. While I am typing this sentence the container is not empty but, importantly, it might very well be: a container is perfectly capable of not containing anything. Less metaphorically, time is a substance that exists independently of events and things located in time, and consequently it is such that it allows straightforwardly for the possibility of there being periods of time during which time continues to pass even if no changes occur (so that the universe is 'frozen' during this period of time) or even if nothing at all occupies it (so that time is 'empty' during this period).Contra substantivalism, the relationist theory of time rejects the idea of time as being independent of events and things placed in it. Rather, relationists claim,