The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends?

Abstract

There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of 'empty time' and 'time without change'. As we shall see, the two allegedly very different rival views are much less different than has been thought: their structure is extremely similar, their strategies are extremely similar, and they can both face the possibilities of 'empty time' and 'time without change' in the same way. Thus, I argue in favour of a certain kind of equivalence between the two views; I discuss a Strong and a Weak version of this claim; and I provide reasons for endorsing the former. I also discuss the parallel between this pair of views about the nature of time and another analogous pair of views: the bundle theory and the substratum theory about the nature of material objects, with respect to the problem with Identity of Indiscernibles. 1.A useful and standard way to introduce the substantivalist theory of time is by the use of 'the container' metaphor and the two central arguments in its favour: the possibility of 'empty time' and the possibility of 'time without change'. According to substantivalism, time is like a container in which events and things are placed, a container that exists independently of what is placed in it. While I am typing this sentence the container is not empty but, importantly, it might very well be: a container is perfectly capable of not containing anything. Less metaphorically, time is a substance that exists independently of events and things located in time, and consequently it is such that it allows straightforwardly for the possibility of there being periods of time during which time continues to pass even if no changes occur (so that the universe is 'frozen' during this period of time) or even if nothing at all occupies it (so that time is 'empty' during this period).Contra substantivalism, the relationist theory of time rejects the idea of time as being independent of events and things placed in it. Rather, relationists claim,

Time and the embodied other in education: A dimension of teachers’ everyday judgements of student learning

“…Linear understandings of time are also known as materialist theories of time (Arthur 2010), substantivalist theories of time (Benovsky 2010), causal theories of time (Smart 1969) or system theories (Nowotny 1992). Linear grids are characterised by seeing time as something concrete, i.e.…”

“…From this standpoint, the container of time is regarded as a singular substantial thing that is shared by everyone and everything and is independent of the people and events taking shape within it (cf. Benovsky 2010). The concreteness of time has also been debated by those who regard the container as a tangible object and claim that the substance of time is an abstract noun, such as a thought or a measure.…”

“…Consequently, in contrast to the linear view, where time is pictured as something that is independent of human action, the relationalist view emphasises that there would be no time without humans, since time take shape in a system of relations that requires human meaning-making (cf. Benovsky 2010;Edling et. al.…”

Super-relationism: combining eliminativism about objects and relationism about spacetime

“…Perduring but qualitatively identical objects require then that one accepts entities (the temporal parts) that are qualitatively identical but numerically distinct, something one might be ready or not to accept, depending on one's philosophical principles. 2 It might be the case, however, that the two views are explanatory equivalent (see Benovsky 2011a). If so, it is worth noting that Schaffer's super-substantivalism and super-relationism are probably equivalent, too.…”

“…Should we take them at face value, positing ontological vagueness in the world (see van Inwagen 1990 andWilliams 2008)? Is there a definite boundary we are not aware of, as claims the epistemicist (see for instance Williamson 1994;Benovsky 2011b)? Or is it a definite boundary, fixed by linguistic conventions, as claims the supervaluationist?…”