Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy

May, Simon

doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00035.x

Cited by 72 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Examining the moral complexity of an issue can give us such an opportunitythat is, an opportunity for moral correction. But it provides no opportunity for compromise, not unlike mutual respect (May 2005). Complexity coupled with humility can only cause us to doubt that our views are correct, and doubt alone is not a reason for compromise.…”

Section: Against Referral As a True Compromisementioning

confidence: 98%

Referral in the Wake of Conscientious Objection to Abortion

McLeod¹

2008

Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy

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Section: Against Referral As a True Compromisementioning

confidence: 98%

Referral in the Wake of Conscientious Objection to Abortion

McLeod¹

2008

Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy

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“…In recent writing, Simon May has presented some important counterarguments to this intuition (in particular, see May 2005). May of course does not deny that compromises occur in pluralist democracies, nor does he deny that there are often very good reasons to compromise.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the possibility of principled moral compromise

Weinstock

2013

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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Simon May has argued that the notion of a principled compromise is incoherent. Reasons to compromise are always in his view strategic: though we think that the position we defend is still the right one, we compromise on this view in order to avoid the undesirable consequences that might flow from not compromising. I argue against May that there are indeed often principled reasons to compromise, and that these reasons are in fact multiple. First, compromises evince respect for persons that we have reason to think of as our epistemic peers, and acknowledgement of our own finitudes as moral reasoners. Second, compromises are often made morally necessary by the shortfalls that unavoidably separate democratic institutions from democratic ideals. Third, compromises express a desirable form of democratic community. And fourth, compromises are often justified from a consequentialist point of view, in that they allow for the realization of values that would not be realized as well by the failure to compromise.

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“…The possible answers we here attribute to party A and the responses we attribute to party B are inspired by a discussion between Simon Cȃbulea May (2005) and Daniel Weinstock (2013). 7 In his paper, May defends that political compromises can, depending on the situation, be justified by means of, what he labels, pragmatic reasons.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation

Laar

Krabbe

2017

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Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.

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Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy

Cited by 72 publications

References 9 publications

Referral in the Wake of Conscientious Objection to Abortion

Referral in the Wake of Conscientious Objection to Abortion

On the possibility of principled moral compromise

Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation

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