Principles of flexible-use spectrum rights

Abstract-Spectrum Access Systems (SAS) are emerging as a principal mechanism for managing the sharing of radio spectrum. The design of the SAS depends on the specification of spectrum property rights and the governance system by which those rights are enforced. Current perspectives on SAS design have been too limited, focusing narrowly on the technical components without adequate consideration of socio-technical factors that will impact the likely success of any SAS design.In this paper, we apply the social science literature on the management of common pool resources (CPR) to the design challenge for the SAS. Heretofore, too much of the discussion has focused on an overly simplistic characterization of the spectrum rights design space as a dichotomous choice between licensed v. unlicensed, markets v. government, and exclusive v. open. The CPR framework forces consideration of a wider class of design options, positioning the specifications of spectrum property rights more appropriately along a multi-dimensional continuum of rights bundles. The CPR framework highlights the importance of considering formal and informal, multi-layered institutional and market-based interactions among SAS stakeholders when designing a resource management system. We will explain how this leads one to view the SAS as a polycentric governance system (using the terminology in the CPR literature). By examining the economic and social context of spectrum sharing, we assert that these emerging systems must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to various forms of resource governance, which refers to the process by which rights are distributed among stakeholders, how those rights are enforced, and how the resource is managed. We illustrate how the insights from the CPR literature might be implemented in a prototype SAS architecture.

show abstract

“…De Vany [2] and Matheson [3], [4] . This is partly the case because the received signal strength of electromagnetic signals varies randomly.…”

Section: Polycentric Governance Of Spectrummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 To date, much of the effort on SAS design has focused overly narrowly on the technical aspects of the system. This is akin to designing an AI expert system without considering the user and the environment in which the expert system will be used as part of the system being designed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socio-technical considerations for Spectrum Access System (SAS) design

Weiss

Lehr²,

Acker

et al. 2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…From an economics perspective, interference is harmful when it impedes the ability of the party holding usage rights to fully exploit the RF electrospace in question (Vany et al, 1969;Matheson, 2006). In practical terms, interference results in system capacity reductions, which can result in system malfunctions which may translate into lost profits.…”

Section: Enforcement In Dsa Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems

et al. 2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum.

show abstract

“…This notion was originally proposed by Coase [12], and subsequently modified by others [21], [22], [30]. The purpose of property rights in spectrum is to limit the amount of interference an owner (or licensee) receives from transmitters associated with other owners (or licensees).…”

Section: Spectrum Assets: Property Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…17 Defining spectrum property rights in this way does not give adjacent users a hard guarantee about the received interference level. Indeed, as discussed in prior work (e.g., [30]), random variations in propagation characteristics and usage patterns over different locations and frequencies would make such a guarantee difficult, if not impossible to enforce. It does however give a user a reasonable expectation about the interference to be expected.…”

Section: A Power Maskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum Markets for Wireless Services

Bae

Beigman²,

Berry³

et al. 2008

2008 3rd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-It has been widely recognized that the current under-utilization of spectrum across many bands could be alleviated through the application of spectrum markets. So far, discussions of market mechanisms for spectrum allocations have focused primarily on secondary markets, which are managed by licensees. Here we explore the consequences of lifting current restrictions on allocations and ownership, and allowing more extensive markets for allocating spectrum across locations, times, and diverse sets of applications (e.g., broadcast, cellular, broadband data, emergency, etc).To motivate our discussion we first estimate the achievable rate per user that could be provided by sharing a large portion of the spectrum suitable for cellular and broadcast types of services. Our results suggest that in general the demand for spectrum may exceed supply implying that market mechanisms are needed to avoid a tragedy of the commons (i.e., associated with an alternative commons model). We then discuss a twotier spectrum market structure for wireless services in which licenses for spectrum assets at particular locations are traded as commodities. Spectrum owners can choose to rent or lease their spectrum assets via spot markets at particular locations. Such an approach may lower barriers to entry into the wireless services market thereby facilitating competition and the introduction of new services.

show abstract

Principles of flexible-use spectrum rights

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Socio-technical considerations for Spectrum Access System (SAS) design

Socio-technical considerations for Spectrum Access System (SAS) design

Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems

Spectrum Markets for Wireless Services

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About