Spectrum Markets for Wireless Services

Bae, Junjik; Beigman, Eyal; Berry, Randall A.; Honig, Michael L.; Shen, Hongxia; Vohra, Rakesh; Zhou, Huicheng

doi:10.1109/dyspan.2008.71

Cited by 26 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Even if licenses are not idle, their spectrum occupancy can be very low. If we turn to the measure of spectrum occupancy, it is claimed that, in some densely populated areas, spectrum occupancy is at most 25% [3].…”

Section: Usage Rights On Wireless Spectrummentioning

confidence: 99%

Options and overbooking strategy in the management of wireless spectrum

Mastroeni

Naldi

2010

Telecommun Syst

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Dynamic spectrum management makes it possible for the owner of usage rights on some frequency blocks to sublet each of them in real time and for a limited period of time. As a softer implementation with respect to the spot market a two stage assignment is here proposed through the use of options, which give buyers the right to purchase the usage right on a single block and for a timeslot. In the sale of options the primary owner may accomplish an overbooking strategy, which consists in selling more blocks than the available ones, and acts as a hedging tool against the risk of unsold blocks. A model for the overbooking strategy is described and evaluated, which takes into account both the value of the option, the correlated decisions taken by the prospective purchasers, and the penalty to be paid to the unsatisfied customers. The dependence of the economical convenience of the overbooking strategy on the relevant parameters (among which the penalty value and the overbooking ratio) is shown for a significant range of cases.

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Section: Usage Rights On Wireless Spectrummentioning

confidence: 99%

Options and overbooking strategy in the management of wireless spectrum

Mastroeni

Naldi

2010

Telecommun Syst

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“…al. [44] propose using market mechanisms for large scale spectrum allocation across many different services. This is considered by many to be eventually feasible with auctionbased markets (see e.g.…”

Section: Flexible Robust Optimizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum Zoning as Robust Optimization

Palaiyanur

Woyach

Tandra

et al. 2010

2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN)

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We study the issue of "spectrum zoning:" the problem of setting stable rules and bandplans -which may or may not give flexibility in use, allow markets, a primary/secondary division, etc. The approach (partially inspired by Rawls) might fairly be called "zoning as robust optimization." The goal is in part to create a framework within which new policy and technical problems can be formulated and attacked quantitatively. For researchers on the technology side, the idea is in part to change our perceived "customer." Traditionally, we have implicitly focused on the needs (perceived and as yet unperceived) of private wireless system builders (e.g. wireless carriers or their suppliers like Qualcomm). To understand the critical issues in zoning, the focus needs to switch to the needs (both perceived and as yet unperceived) of the government regulators. In particular, regulators need a principled way of deciding amongst alternatives for zoning to yield the greatest social good. This can be accomplished in a quantitative optimization framework. In this paper, one such framework is set forth and issues caused by moving away from a 'command and control' regime towards a more modern approach to spectrum management involving white-space channels and spectrum markets are explored. As an initial fruit of this framework, it can be seen that flexible band plans perform well in response to uncertain use preferences, even while not being optimal in a Pareto-efficiency sense, provided the overheads are not too large.

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“…Recent initiatives by government agencies extend the reach of spectrum management policies that license holders (e.g., network providers) are entitled to pursue [3,6,[9][10][11]27]. In particular, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) introduced a new spectrum access policy model known as Private Commons to support fast time-scale spectrum transactions [1,8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition in Private Commons: Price War or Market Sharing?

Kavurmacioglu

Alanyali

Starobinski

2016

IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking

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Abstract-This paper characterizes the outcomes of secondary spectrum markets when multiple providers compete for secondary demand. We study a competition model in which each provider aims to enhance its revenue by opportunistically serving a price dependent secondary demand, while also serving dedicated primary demand. We consider two methodologies for sharing spectrum between primary and secondary demand: In coordinated access, spectrum providers have the option to decline a secondary access request if that helps enhance their revenue. We explicitly characterize a break-even price such that profitability of secondary access provision is guaranteed if secondary access is priced above the break-even price, regardless of the volume of secondary demand. Consequently, we establish that competition among providers that employ optimal coordinated access leads to a price war, as a result of which the provider with the lowest break-even price captures the entire market. This result holds for arbitrary secondary demand functions. In uncoordinated access, primary and secondary users share spectrum on equal basis, akin to ISM bands. Under this policy, we characterize a market sharing price which determines a provider's willingness to share the market. We show an instance where the market sharing price is strictly greater than the break-even price, indicating that market equilibrium in an uncoordinated access setting can be fundamentally different as it opens up the possibility of providers sharing the market at higher prices.

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Spectrum Markets for Wireless Services

Cited by 26 publications

References 24 publications

Options and overbooking strategy in the management of wireless spectrum

Options and overbooking strategy in the management of wireless spectrum

Spectrum Zoning as Robust Optimization

Competition in Private Commons: Price War or Market Sharing?

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