Private attacks in longest chain proof-of-stake protocols with single secret leader elections

Abstract

Single Secret Leader Elections have recently been proposed as an improved leader election mechanism for proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains. However, the security gain they provide has not been quantified. In this work, we present a comparison of PoS longestchain protocols that are based on Single Secret Leader Elections (SSLE) -that elect exactly one leader per round -versus those based on Probabilistic Leader Elections (PLE) -where one leader is elected on expectation. Our analysis shows that when considering the private attack -the worst attack on longest-chain protocols [14] -the security gained from using SSLE is substantial: the settlement time is decreased by ∼ 25% for a 33% or 25% adversary. Furthermore, when considering grinding attacks, we find that the security threshold is increased by 10% (from 0.26 in the PLE case to 0.36 in the SSLE case) and the settlement time is decreased by roughly 70% for a 20% adversary in the SSLE case.

Analyzing the Threats to Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identities by Conducting a Literature Survey

“…Several mining issues are explained. Specific attacks are the nothing-at-stake attack for PoS, pre-computation attack in PoW+PoS hybrid mode, the long-range attack in PoS, which is similar to the 51% attack (all described by Yu et al [47]), the mining pool attack [49], and the private attack for PoS [60]. Furthermore, the flood and loot attack [94] and the wormhole attack [59] are outlined in the literature.…”

Homomorphic Sortition -- Secret Leader Election for PoS Blockchains

“…Quantifying the gains of SSLE In subsequent work, Azouvi and Cappelletti [3] performed an in-depth analysis of potential performance gains of using SSLE. They compared protocols that elect one leader on expectation (that is, some rounds might elect none or several leaders) which are known as Probabilistic Leader Election -PLE -with SSLE.…”