Private self-consciousness, self-awareness, and the reliability of self-reports.

Abstract

Two studies found that individuals high in private self-consciousness provide self-reports of greater reliability across time than individuals low in private self-consciousness. In addition, Study 2 found that a successful manipulation of self-awareness did not affect test-retest reliability of self-reports among Ss either high or low in private self-consciousness. The hypothesis that individuals high in private self-consciousness have articulated self-schemata of greater temporal stability than individuals low in private self-consciousness received support. The discussion considers (a) how private selfconsciousness, but not self-awareness, influenced test-retest reliability of self-reports, (b) how private self-consciousness and self-awareness may both influence, albeit differentially, the eriterionrelated validity of self-reports, and (c) the possibility that current models of self-consciousness-selfawareness require reformulation.Private self-consciousness (e.g., Fenigstein, scheier, & Buss, 1975), a cognitive style, denotes habitual attentiveness to or awareness of the self. Since Fenigstein et al. (1975) originally proposed the construct, research has examined numerous correlates of private self-consciousness, which Buss (1980), Carver and Scheier (1981), and scheier and Carver (1983) have reviewed.Not surprisingly, several correlates pertain to the processing of self-referent information. For example, individuals high in private self-consciousness (a) write more detailed self-descriptions (Turner, 1978b), (b) decide more quickly whether trait adjectives describe the self (Mueller, 1982;Turner, 1978c), (c) recall more self-referent material under conditions of incidental learning (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull & Levy, 1979, Experiment 1;Turner, 1980), and (d) commit more false alarms to self-descriptive traits but fewer to non-self-descriptive traits during a recognition memory task (Nasby, 1985(Nasby, , 1989) than do individuals low in private self-consciousness.The previous studies have established relations between private self-consciousness and either the accuracy or the efficiency (e.g., speed, productivity) of processing self-referent information. Cognitive tasks that assess either accuracy or efficiency provide two means of inferring the degree to which an articulated schema has guided performance (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Kihlstrom & Nasby, 1981;Nasby & Kihlstrom, 1986). Consequently, from the convergent results of the previous studies, several investigators (e.g., Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984;Nasby, 1985) have concluded that individuals high in private self-consciousness have articulated self-schemata (e.g., Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1983;Markus, 1980;Rogers, 1981) 950third means of inferring the degree to which an articulated schema has guided performance (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984;Markus, 1977). Considering the relation between schematic articulation and response consistency, individuals high in private self-consciousness should also process self-referent information more consistently than do i...

Factor Structure of the Private Self-Consciousness Scale: Role of Item Wording

“…Fenigstein et al suggested that the 23-item scale taps three aspects of self-consciousness: Private Self-Consciousness (PrSC), Public Self-Consciousness, and Social Anxiety. Numerous studies have revealed satisfactory levels of reliability of these three subscales (Fenigstein et al, 1975;Hjelle & Bernard, 1994;McFarland & Sparks, 1985;Nasby, 1989).…”

Subjective Experience: Its Conceptual Status, Method of Investigation, and Psychological Significance

“…And it was Thayer (1971) who made use of this finding to show that those scoring low on a version of the F scale (by implication more self-reflective) were significantly more accurate in their selfratings of physiological changes taking place within themselves. More recently, research with versions of the private self-consciousness measure first constructed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) has produced similar evidence (e.g., Nasby, 1989) that those who know themselves best (i.e., are most self-aware) make more accurate estimates of their actual behavior than those who know themselves least. Again, when Richardson and McAndrew (1990) used a shortened version of this scale that emphasized internal state awareness (rather than mere self-reflectiveness), they found that more complex imagination images were reported (under conditions of photic stimulation) by those who were most aware of their internal states.…”

Private vs. public self-consciousness and self-discrepancies

“…In this approach it is assumed that there are people almost permanently focused on themselves by evaluating their own behavior. Such people more accurately assess their characteristics, as shown by the higher correspondence observed in their case between self-description and behavior (Fenigstein, 2009;Nasby, 1989). On the other hand, there are people characterized by very low insight stemming from self-awareness.…”

“…The ideal self, representing personal hopes and dreams, should lend itself to such self-perception in which, performing a deeper analysis, an individual can see how far he or she is from his or her own ideals. Generating a larger self-discrepancy may stem from better insight in a person exhibiting a higher level of private self-consciousness (Nasby, 1989).…”