Privileged Access Naturalized

Fernández, Jordi

doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00317

Cited by 41 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…For further discussions of introspective transparency, see Cullison (2007) and Fernández (2003). Fernández (2003) characterizes privileged access in terms of a non-empirical basis for selfascriptions of belief, and a distinction between kinds of justification for beliefs about one's own beliefs and beliefs about others' beliefs. He writes, "When a mental state such as a sensation, perceptual experience, or a belief is self-ascribed by S, the self-ascription normally enjoys a characteristic entitlement or epistemic right" (Fernández 2003: 353).…”

Section: The Idealized Rational Self As a Roadblock To Understanding mentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self

Berenstain¹

2018

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of colorand the corresponding overrepresentation of white men-is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that acceptance of the idealized rational self leads philosophers to underestimate the influence of implicit bias on their own judgments and prevents them from enacting the reforms necessary to minimize the effects of implicit bias on institutional decision-making procedures. I consider recent experiments in social psychology that suggest that an increased sense of one's own objectivity leads to greater reliance on bias in hiring scenarios, and I hypothesize how these results might be applied to philosophers' evaluative judgments. I discuss ways that the idealized rational self is susceptible to broader critiques of ideal theory, and I consider some of the ways that the picture functions as a tool of active ignorance and color-evasive racism.

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Section: The Idealized Rational Self As a Roadblock To Understanding mentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self

Berenstain¹

2018

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…(Perception is usually reliable.) Similarly, you are justified in believing that you believe that the garden looks nice on the basis of the very same perceptual experience of the garden because, normally, your perceptually experiencing that some fact p is the case correlates with your believing that p, since we usually take perception at face value (Fernández, 2003).…”

Section: Bypass and Hyper‐reflexivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For reasons of space, I cannot address these two issues here. See, respectively, Fernández, 2003 and 2005 for defences of these two virtues of the model.…”

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confidence: 99%

Thought Insertion and Self‐Knowledge

Fernández

2010

Mind & Language

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I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way.

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“…But there are many different senses of the term (e.g., Alston, 1971;Gallois, 1996;Gertler, 2003). I differentiate here between two main epistemic claims: on the one hand, the security of self-ascriptions and, on the other, the peculiarity of self-ascriptions (see also Wright, 1998;Fernandez, 2003;Gertler, 2010;Smithies and Stoljar, 2012). Roughly, the latter maintains that self-ascriptions can be known differently from the way we know the ascriptions to others; the former states that self-ascriptions can be known better than the ascriptions to others.…”

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confidence: 96%

The peculiarity and contingency of the introspection of belief

Brasi

2015

Filosofia Unisinos

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The Causal Model of introspection has its more than fair share of critics and indeed in recent years the model has fallen out of favor in the philosophical world. In this paper, I defend the model and argue that it is an excellent candidate, given a realist commitment about the mental, to explain our peculiar, but contingent, introspective access to beliefs. Keywords: causal model, introspection, belief, peculiarity of self-ascriptions, contingency of self-ascriptions. ResumoO modelo causal de introspecção tem recebido muitas críticas e, de fato, nos últimos anos, tem caído em desuso no mundo filosófico. Neste artigo defendo o modelo e sustento que ele é um excelente candidato, dado um compromisso realista para com o mental, para explicar o nosso acesso introspectivo peculiar, mas contingente, às crenças.Palavras-chave: modelo causal, introspecção, crença, peculiaridade de autoatribuições, contingência de autoatribuições.

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Privileged Access Naturalized

Cited by 41 publications

References 6 publications

Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self

Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self

Thought Insertion and Self‐Knowledge

The peculiarity and contingency of the introspection of belief

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