Thought Insertion and Self‐Knowledge

Fernández, Jordi

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01381.x

Cited by 20 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…A different criticism of the agency view of authorship has been put forward by a number of authors who argue that the lack of authorship in thought insertion really is the inability of the subject to rationally endorse the content of the inserted thoughts (Bortolotti and Broome, ; Fernández, ; Pickard, ). According to these authors, what is central to thought insertion is not the experience of passivity with respect to the inserted thought, as is suggested by the agency view.…”

Section: Introspection Authorship and Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authorship and Control over Thoughts

Vosgerau

Voss

2014

Mind & Language

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The ‘mineness’ of thoughts has often been accepted as indubitable in philosophy. However, the symptom of thought insertion in schizophrenia seems to be an empirical counterexample to the dictum that every introspected thought is one's own. We present a thorough conceptual analysis of mineness of thought, distinguishing between ownership and authorship (thought agency). We argue that it is indeed a conceptual truth that introspected thoughts are owned by the introspector. However, there are everyday and pathological cases of thoughts, for which we do not ascribe authorship to ourselves. To explain inserted thoughts, however, we need an additional factor which is constituted by the lack of control over inserted thoughts (as with intrusive thoughts in patients suffering from OCD). We present a review of empirical data on thought control and thought insertion in the light of the conceptual analysis. We conclude with a summary of the most important future direction of research.

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Section: Introspection Authorship and Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authorship and Control over Thoughts

Vosgerau

Voss

2014

Mind & Language

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“…10 In other words, if one attributes an attitude to oneself in a way that qualifies as self-knowledge, then that attitude is regarded by one as having to comply with the available grounds that one has for taking that attitude. 11 As a result, one looks for reasons, or grounds, for having the attitude at issue (assuming, that is, that one is rational) and, consequently, one endorses, or avows, the attitude that one attributes to oneself.…”

Section: Ownership As Endorsementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Schizophrenia and the estranged self

Fernández

Bliss

2016

Evaluation Clinical Practice

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How does schizophrenia affect a subject's sense of self? In this paper, we discuss the experience of alienation of mental states and actions that can take place in schizophrenia. We begin by highlighting this experience in delusions of thought insertion and delusions of made feelings, impulses and actions. Next, we offer a proposal about the nature of this experience by utilizing some of the current philosophical research on self-knowledge. The proposal is that the experience of thoughts, feelings, impulses and actions as not being one's own is the experience of regarding those states as not being responsive to reasons. Then, we put forward a hypothesis about why schizophrenia can lead to this experience by drawing on the psychiatric literature on the disorder. The hypothesis is that subjects who suffer the four delusions are unable to regard some of their thoughts, feelings, impulses and actions as being responsive to reasons because they suffer from a tendency to focus their attention on their own perceptual experiences, as opposed to focusing it on the world. The lesson to draw from the alienation of mental states and actions caused by schizophrenia will be, finally, that two separate components normally make up our sense of self; two components that turn out to be dissociated in the four schizophrenic delusions discussed. These are, on the one hand, the self as the bearer, or host, of mental states and actions and, on the other hand, the self as the owner and agent, respectively, of those mental states and actions.

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“…Alterations to the SoA in relation to thoughts, in contrast, can produce the feeling that a thought arises from a source external to the self, as is the case with the delusion of thought insertion (TI; Fernandez, 2010; Martin & Pacherie, 2013). In TI, thoughts are experienced as inserted into the individual’s mind (“head”) from an external source.…”

Section: Sense Of Agency In the Dream Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

I’m thinking your thoughts while I sleep: Sense of agency and ownership over dream thought.

Rosen¹

2015

Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice

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found that although TI and AH both occur in dreams, TI is very rare. This is an interesting result since TI is common in patients with schizophrenia. I propose two speculative lines of explanation for the rarity of TI in dreams: first, the cognitive differences between the symptoms of schizophrenia and dreams, and second, the problem of dream reporting conditions. Dream reporting conditions are particularly important, as without controls, reports can be vague. Analysis of dream reports reveals that it is often unclear whether 'hearing voices' indicates sound phenomenology or thought phenomenology. I propose that dream reports could be disambiguated given the right experimental conditions and I suggest how this could be achieved in future experimental research.

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Thought Insertion and Self‐Knowledge

Cited by 20 publications

References 22 publications

Authorship and Control over Thoughts

Authorship and Control over Thoughts

Schizophrenia and the estranged self

I’m thinking your thoughts while I sleep: Sense of agency and ownership over dream thought.

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