“Pro‐Peace Entrepreneur” or “Conflict Profiteer”? Critical Perspective on the Private Sector and Peacebuilding in Nepal

Abstract

Focusing on a case study from Nepal, this article argues that as the private sector is a heterogeneous constituency consisting of a variety of actors who can perform in favor of or against peace, generalizing the entire sector as either a builder or spoiler of peace can be deeply misleading. Instead, this article proposes an alternative approach that may help to understand the personal and structural dimensions that make up a business response to peace and conflict. These two dimensions, which can be better understood in terms of a business actor's self‐interests, motivations, and the economic incentive structures and mechanisms, are central in shaping businesses' attitudes and responses toward peace and conflict. The personal and structural dimensions may provide an analytical framework that distinguishes between business actors who might want to benefit from political instability and conflict and those who may want to support peace initiatives. In this article, these two categories of the private sector are referred to as “conflict profiteers” and “pro˗peace entrepreneurs” respectively. While the business activities of a conflict profiteer may exacerbate conflict dynamics, by contrast a pro‐peace entrepreneur can contribute to building peace in Nepal.

The impact of multinational enterprises on public governance institutions in areas of limited statehood

“…Here they saw themselves more as institution takers which ties into new institutional theory about how organizations conform to the prevailing environment through processes of institutional isomorphism. Our work supports prior research (Evans, 2007;Subedi, 2013) on the potentially negative consequences for host countries that result from a lack of MNEs meaningfully engaging with local development and adopting a hit-and-run approach of short-termism and exploitative profiteering. This often manifests in the reinforcement of corrupt institutional practices, the exploitation of valuable natural resources without linkages into the rest of the economy, the fostering of a conflict economy and co-opting of warlords, the creation of state dependency on MNE benefactors, patronage affording undue influence on regulatory processes, and social unrest as a result of environmental impacts and unfair labor practices.…”

Systematic review: entrepreneurship in conflict and post conflict

“…On the other hand, unproductive entrepreneurship may also play a negative role while resisting opportunity because of danger and avoiding risks (Rettberg et al , 2011). In Nepal, a study addresses “conflict profiteers” who may push form more conflict and “pro-peace entrepreneurs” who support reconciliation (Subedi, 2013). All such types of entrepreneurship appear in conflict areas (Rettberg et al , 2011).…”

“…On the other hand, and not very far from the common institutional explanation, Subedi again in a research conducted in Nepal focused on a mixture of personal dimensions such as motivation and self-commitment, and structural dimensions which converge institutional context (Subedi, 2013).…”

Entrepreneurship, Conflict, and Peace: The Role of Inclusion and Value Creation

“…On the other hand, entrepreneurship has been criticized by other observers as being ineffective in facilitating peace (Miller et al, 2019), with a parallel body of work citing the conflict-causing role that entrepreneurship can play (Ahmad, 2015; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Korf, 2005; Miklian, 2019; Nystrand, 2014). Entrepreneurs’ role in peace and conflict appears paradoxical (Austin & Wennmann, 2017; Joseph et al, 2020), with the contradictory elements of local private-sector engagement detailed across various academic fields (Andreas, 2009; Miklian, 2019; Miller et al, 2019; Rettberg et al, 2011; Rolandsen, 2019; Subedi, 2013). Cohesive theory to understand such variation is therefore needed (Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019) in order to explicate the broader impacts of entrepreneurship on sustainable peace (Fajardo et al, 2019; Miklian & Schouten, 2019).…”