Probabilistic Quorum Systems

Malkhi, Dahlia; Reiter, Michael K.; Wool, Avishai; Wright, Rebecca N.

doi:10.1006/inco.2001.3054

Cited by 123 publications

(129 citation statements)

References 37 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

127

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…HQ combines the use of quorums and consensus techniques to provide high performance during normal operation and minimize overhead during periods of contention [17]. Probabilistic techniques have also been proposed to reduce the overhead of using quorum systems to provide Byzantine fault-tolerance [18,19]. Hendricks et al [20] proposed the use of erasure coding to minimize the overhead of a Byzantine fault-tolerant storage system.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bosco: One-Step Byzantine Asynchronous Consensus

Song

Renesse

2008

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Asynchronous Byzantine consensus algorithms are an important primitive for building Byzantine fault-tolerant systems. Algorithms for Byzantine consensus typically require at least two communication steps for decision; in many systems, this imposes a significant performance overhead. In this paper, we show that it is possible to design Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus algorithms that decide in one message latency under contention-free scenarios and still provide strong consistency guarantees when contention occurs. We define two variants of one-step asynchronous Byzantine consensus and show a lower bound on the number of processors needed for each. We present a Byzantine consensus algorithm, Bosco, for asynchronous networks that meets these bounds, even in the face of a strong network adversary.

show abstract

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bosco: One-Step Byzantine Asynchronous Consensus

Song

Renesse

2008

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Contrast this with (2) and with the consistency requirement for traditional probabilistic masking quorum systems [10] (adapted to consider access sets), which requires that the faulty participants (qualified or not) cannot produce sufficient votes for a candidate to be observed in expectation:…”

Section: Type Of Servermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Write markers require no communication assumptions beyond those of the probabilistic quorums for which they are used. For completeness, we summarize the model of [11], which is common to prior works in probabilistic [10] and signed [13] quorum systems: we assume that each nonfaulty client can successfully communicate with each non-faulty server with high probability, and hence with all non-faulty servers with roughly equal probability. This assumption is in place to ensure that the network does not significantly bias a non-faulty client's interactions with servers either toward faulty servers or toward different non-faulty servers than those with which another non-faulty client can interact.…”

Section: Definitions and System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Probabilistic quorum systems relax the quorum intersection properties, asking them to hold only with high probability. More specifically, they relax (2) or (3), for example, to hold only with probability 1 − ǫ (for ǫ, a small constant), where probabilities are taken with respect to the selection of quorums according to an access strategy p [10,11]. This technique yields masking quorum constructions tolerating b < n/2.62 and opaque quorum constructions tolerating b < n/3.15 as seen in Table 1.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This represents an improvement in load and the number of faults that can be tolerated. Probabilistic masking quorums without write markers can tolerate up to b < n/2.62 faults [11] and achieve load no better than Ω(b/n) [10]. In addition, the maximum number of faults that can be tolerated is tied to the size of quorums [10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Write Markers for Probabilistic Quorum Systems

Merideth

Reiter

2008

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Probabilistic quorum systems can tolerate a larger fraction of faults than can traditional (strict) quorum systems, while guaranteeing consistency with an arbitrarily high probability for a system with enough replicas. However, the masking and opaque types of probabilistic quorum systems are hampered in that their optimal load-a best-case measure of the work done by the busiest replica, and an indicator of scalability-is little better than that of strict quorum systems. In this paper we present a variant of probabilistic quorum systems that uses write markers in order to limit the extent to which Byzantine-faulty servers act together. Our masking and opaque probabilistic quorum systems have asymptotically better load than the bounds proven for previous masking and opaque quorum systems. Moreover, the new masking and opaque probabilistic quorum systems can tolerate an additional 24% and 17% of faulty replicas, respectively, compared with probabilistic quorum systems without write markers.

show abstract

Evaluating Intrusion‐Tolerant Certification Authority Systems

Lin

Jing

Liu

2011

Quality & Reliability Eng

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Various intrusion-tolerant certification authority (CA) systems have been proposed to provide attack resilient certificate signing (or update) services. However, it is difficult to compare them against each other directly, due to the diversity in system organizations, threshold signature schemes, protocols and usage scenarios. We present a framework for intrusion-tolerant CA system evaluation, which consists of three components, namely, an intrusion-tolerant CA model, a threat model and a metric for comparative evaluation. The evaluation framework covers system organizations, protocols, usage scenarios, the period of certificate validity, the revocation rate and the mean time to recovery. Based on the framework, four representative systems are evaluated and compared in three typical usage scenarios, producing reasonable and insightful results. The interdependence between usage scenarios and system characteristics is investigated, providing a guideline to design better systems for different usage scenarios. The proposed framework provides an effective and practicable method to evaluate intrusion-tolerant CA systems quantitatively, and helps customers to choose and configure an intrusion-tolerant CA system. Moreover, the comparison results offer valuable insights to further improve the attack resilience of intrusion-tolerant CA systems.To validate the framework, an in-depth comparative evaluation of four representative intrusion-tolerant CA systems (ITTC, 53 ARECA, 25 COCA 57 and MOCA 56 ), is conducted. After analyzing these systems, we evaluate them in three typical usage scenarios (LANs, the Internet and ad hoc networks), and study the evaluation results with small variations of the usage scenario parameters. The interdependence between usage scenarios and system characteristics is also studied based on the evaluation results. Then, several conclusions and suggestions for designing better systems are presented. The analysis can be applied to facilitate designing a new system to obtain optimal performance in a certain usage scenario. Note that in this paper, performance means attack resilience.Although COCA provides two types of certificate services, that is, update and query, only the certificate update service is compared with other CA systems in our evaluation framework because a commodity CA typically does not support certificate query. To support attack resilient certificate query, the COCA design is not solely driven by maximizing the resilience of certificate update services. As a result, the comparisons are not meant to judge the overall design of COCA. Instead, the framework compares only the certificate update service of COCA with other genuine certificate update solutions. To make this point clear, in the rest of this paper we denote COCA as COCA CUS (certificate update service). of the Internet P C , P A and P D are estimated based on statistics on the Internet. In 2003, 202,369,889 hosts (denoted as N h ) were advertised in Internet domain survey (DNS) averagely, 22 and 137,529 incidents (denoted as ...

show abstract

Probabilistic Quorum Systems

Cited by 123 publications

References 37 publications

Bosco: One-Step Byzantine Asynchronous Consensus

Bosco: One-Step Byzantine Asynchronous Consensus

Write Markers for Probabilistic Quorum Systems

Evaluating Intrusion‐Tolerant Certification Authority Systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About