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Singh, Bhupendra Bahadur; Al-Dargazelli, S.S.

doi:10.1103/physrevc.4.2144

Cited by 9 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Sufficient radiation to be detected by a sensitive portal monitor may penetrate even heavy shielding. 90 Sr and its short-lived daughter 90 Y are β-emitters, but also emit a significant γ-ray flux by internal bremsstrahlung [2]. In contrast, 210 Po, 238 Pu and 241 Am are α-particle emitters with very weak or nearly undetectable γ-ray activity, are easily shielded from portal monitors, and pose little hazard unless in contact with the body.…”

Section: Radiological Dispersal Devices (Rdd)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Scanning of vehicles for nuclear materials

Katz¹

2014

AIP Conference Proceedings

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Might a nuclear-armed terrorist group or state use ordinary commerce to deliver a nuclear weapon by smuggling it in a cargo container or vehicle? This delivery method would be the only one available to a sub-state actor, and it might enable a state to make an unattributed attack. Detection of a weapon or fissile material smuggled in this manner is difficult because of the large volume and mass available for shielding. Here I review methods for screening cargo containers to detect the possible presence of nuclear threats. Because of the large volume of innocent international commerce, and the cost and disruption of secondary screening by opening and inspection, it is essential that the method be rapid and have a low false-positive rate. Shielding can prevent the detection of neutrons emitted spontaneously or by induced fission. The two promising methods are muon tomography and high energy X-radiography. If they do not detect a shielded threat object they can detect the shield itself.

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Section: Radiological Dispersal Devices (Rdd)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Scanning of vehicles for nuclear materials

Katz¹

2014

AIP Conference Proceedings

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“…The beam was incident on a 40 cm-long glass target cell containing the 3 He gas at approximately 9.3 bar (corresponding to the surface-area density of 0.043 g=cm 2 ), which was polarized by hybrid spin-exchange optical pumping [22][23][24][25]. The in-plane orientation of the polarization was maintained by two pairs of Helmholtz coils.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%