Problems of Party and Campaign Financing in Germany and the United States--Some Comparative Reflections

Lösche, Peter

doi:10.4324/9780429042232-9

Cited by 6 publications

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“…This helps rationalize the capture of public procurement across the government. As discussed earlier, the prevalence of monetization of politics and the involvement of private financiers are noted in developed countries, with the difference that the practices are more legalized, at least formally (L€ osche, 1993;Pulzer, 2002). Grzymala-Busse ( 2008) assimilates the rational for state capture to the private benefits of public officeholders.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monetization of politics and public procurement in Ghana

Lassou

Sorola

Senkl

et al. 2023

AAAJ

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PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the prevalence of corruption in Ghana to understand how and why it has turned public procurement into a mere money-making scheme instead of a means to provide needed public goods and services.Design/methodology/approachThe study focuses on Ghana as a case study and mobilizes the monetization of politics lenses. Data are collected via interviews with key officials across the procurement sector (including the government, donors and civil society), documents, documentaries and news articles.FindingsThe findings suggest that the increasing costs of elections and political financing coupled with the costs of vote-buying, which has become informally institutionalized, intensify corruption practices and, consequently, turns public procurement into a mere source of cash for political ends. Political appointments and legalized loopholes facilitate this by helping to nullify the safeguard accounting and other control institutions are designed to provide. Likewise, enduring poverty and rising inequality “force” citizens into a vote-buying culture which distorts democratic premises that may drive out unscrupulous politicians; thus, perpetuating capture schemes. Civil society's efforts to remedy these have had little success, and corruption and inequality remain rife.Practical implicationsThe main practical implication of the study lies in the need for a gradual demonetization of elections, and the consideration of the fundamental function of public procurement as a policy instrument embedded in economic, social, cultural and environmental plans. Additionally, given the connectedness of the various corruption issues raised, a comprehensive system-based approach in dealing with them would be more effective than a piecemeal approach targeting each issue/problem in isolation.Originality/valueWhile extant literature has examined the issue of endemic corruption in developing countries using state capture, few have attempted to explain why it remains enduring, particularly in public procurement. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on corruption and state capture theoretically and empirically by drawing on monetization of politics from political science to explain why corruption and state capture endure in certain contexts (with Ghana as an illustrative example) which reduce public procurement to a cash-milking scheme.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monetization of politics and public procurement in Ghana

Lassou

Sorola

Senkl

et al. 2023

AAAJ

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“…This theoretical claim has found support in empirical studies, showing that governing parties tend to enjoy higher incomes than opposition parties (Fink 2017;Lösche 1993). Furthermore, business donations have been found to be influenced by power status at the state level: Fink (2017), analysing private and business donors' spending patterns in the German states, showed that only corporate donors tend to give more to governing parties than to opposition parties.…”

Section: Party Financing In Federal Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Financing party branches: Evidence from the German federal system

Jacob

2021

Regional & Federal Studies

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Adequately financed branches contribute to the integration of regional interests into statewide parties. Yet, we have limited knowledge about the determinants of branches' varying income levels in federal contexts. To address this shortage, this article elucidates why branches receive donations from citizens and businesses to different degrees. I hypothesise that party competition at the state level, the difference in regional economic performance and parties' historical legacies can account for the level of branches' donation revenue. Analysing German statewide party branches' income from 2009 to 2017, this study finds support for the facilitating impact of state and federal electoral contests on donation levels. Regional economic disparities, by contrast, only marginally affect donation revenues. At the same time, parties' path-dependent developments help explain asymmetries in average revenue levels between western and eastern branches. The study's findings suggest that intense regional party competition contributes to branches' financial independence within the statewide party organisation.

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“…This reinforces an important paradox to consider, which is that in these terms, the primary problem is 'not corruption, crime, tax evasion, undue influence of fat cats or special interest groups, but the appearance of corruption, crime or undue influence'. 17 If we look at perceptions data from the introduction of PPERA to the present day we see this in stark relief. Public opinion surveys overwhelmingly show that the public believes that both institutional and individual donors have too much influence on the political process.…”

Section: The Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act (2000)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Transparency Paradox: Why Transparency Alone will not Improve Campaign Regulations

Power¹

2020

Political Quarterly

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The role of new sources of data has become of increasing interest to those involved in political campaigning and a legislative focus of policy makers and regulators. Utilising Karl-Heinz Nassmacher's 'magic quadrangle' of 'accounting, practicality, sanctions and transparency' and a case study of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 this article unpicks how successful the 'guiding philosophy' of transparency was in delivering increased citizen confidence in the democratic process. I ultimately argue that at the heart of all discussions about what regulation in this area should look like, an uncomfortable paradox has to be accepted: that transparency may well help to quell actual instances of malfeasance and the misuse of data, but may at the same time increase citizen distrust in democratic processes. Any regulation should consider the ways in which transparency might be implemented such that it better supports the stated legislative aims.

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Problems of Party and Campaign Financing in Germany and the United States--Some Comparative Reflections

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Monetization of politics and public procurement in Ghana

Monetization of politics and public procurement in Ghana

Financing party branches: Evidence from the German federal system

The Transparency Paradox: Why Transparency Alone will not Improve Campaign Regulations

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