Producing and Manipulating Information

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information. Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate information to bring the policy decision more in line with her preferences. We show that experts who are unbiased toward the policy alternatives put highest effort in collecting information. Eliminating manipulation of information, however, requires that the preferences of the policy maker and the expert are aligned. Hence, when selecting an expert, policy makers face a trade-off. We show that policy makers optimally appoint experts with policy preferences which are less extreme than their own. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: D78, D82, D83.

Policy makers, advisers, and reputation

“…The following Lemma summarizes the above discussion. 5 Lemma 1 Suppose that the policy maker always follows the adviser's recommendation. Then, reputational concerns lead advisers to recommend against the project for a wider range of parameters.…”

Teoria informacional e a seleção de relatores na Câmara dos Deputados

“…Para fundamentar teoricamente esta interpretação, fazemos uso da literatura sobre decisão sob condição de incerteza, mais especificamente dos trabalhos que dizem respeito à produção, transmissão e uso de informação, e que têm aplicação à questão substantiva que estamos analisando (Calvert, 1985;Crawford e Sobel, 1982;Dur e Swank, 2005;Krishna e Morgan, 2001;Milgrom e Roberts, 1986).…”

“…A delegação ao relator, por outro lado, não está livre de problemas de agência: existem os riscos de o relator não se esforçar o suficiente na produção de informação e de usar estrategicamente a informação produzida, em detrimento do mediano da comissão (Dur e Swank, 2005). O primeiro risco diz respeito à qualidade da informação; o segundo, à qualidade da recomendação.…”

Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?

“…An alternative situation is that parties have information but have to make e¤ort to convey it to the decision maker. 6 To analyze the latter case, we assume that when choosing their strategies on e¤ort, parties know . In the new 6 Empirical research suggests that interest groups expend resources to convey their messages to policy makers.…”

“…6 To analyze the latter case, we assume that when choosing their strategies on e¤ort, parties know . In the new 6 Empirical research suggests that interest groups expend resources to convey their messages to policy makers. For a review of empirical models of interest group in ‡uence see Potters and Sloof (1996) and Stratmann (2005).…”