Production and joint emission reduction decisions based on two-way cost-sharing contract under cap-and-trade regulation

Wang, Zhongrui; Brownlee, Alexander E. I.; Wu, Qinghua

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2020.106549

Cited by 81 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Moreover, cost-sharing contracts have been widely used as an effective mechanism to encourage supply chain coordination, which is also highly related to our study [30]. Wang et al [31] established single and joint emission reduction models with one-way or twoway cost-sharing contracts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 59%

“…where μ > 0, representing the manufacturer's cost elasticity coefficient of emission reduction; and, according to cost-sharing contract [31], assume that the manufacturer invests in reducing emissions, and the retailer bears a certain percentage of emission reduction costs. (4) e demand function of the channel in the dualchannel supply chain is affected by the price of its own channel and that of the alternative channel.…”

Section: Notation and Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Government Low‐Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual‐Channel Supply Chain

et al. 2021

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As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 59%

Section: Notation and Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Government Low‐Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual‐Channel Supply Chain

et al. 2021

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“…Zhang et al [ 19 ] discussed carbon emission reduction decisions of low-carbon supply chain members with retailer’s fairness concern and subsidies. Under cap-and-trade regulation policy, Wang et al [ 20 ] studied production and joint emission reduction decisions and designed a two-way cost-sharing contract. Based on the carbon footprint of the product, Wang et al [ 21 ] discussed low-carbon supply chain members’ joint emission reduction decisions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Analyzing and summarizing the above literature, we can see some literature studied consumers’ low-carbon preference [ 12 , 14 , 15 , 23 ], some studied government regulations [ 19 , 20 , 25 ], some studied supply chain members’ behavior preference [ 15 , 19 ], some discussed dual-channel and supply chain competition [ 13 , 22 , 26 ], and some investigated supply chain coordination [ 12 , 14 , 20 , 25 ]. However, the low-carbon supply chain optimization models that the above literature establish are all static low-carbon supply chain optimization models.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

Zhang

2021

IJERPH

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Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer’s optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.

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“…Wang et al studied the long-term dynamic cooperative emission reduction and government subsidy strategies of a two-level supply chain [29]. Wang et al established single and joint emission-reduction models in which supply chain members could adopt one-or two-way cost-sharing contracts and analysed the optimal strategy design and appropriate sharing rate contract [30]. Wang studied the decision-making problem of a two-echelon supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer [31].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Investment in Carbon Emission‐Reducing Technology Based on Stochasticity and Low‐Carbon Preferences

Shan

Hou

2021

Complexity

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Due to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emission-reducing measures are urgently needed. Important emission-reduction measures mainly include carbon trading and low-carbon cost subsidies. Comprehensive consideration of these two policies is a research hotspot in the field of low-carbon technology investment. Based on this background, this paper considers the impact of consumer low-carbon preferences on market demand and the impact of uncertainty in carbon emission-reduction behaviour. We construct a stochastic differential game model with upstream and downstream enterprises based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy. From a dynamic perspective, this paper researches the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution characteristics of the joint emission-reduction mechanism in a supply chain. This paper discusses the sensitivity of the parameters and uses numerical simulation to verify the impact of each parameter on the emission-reduction decision-making activities of stakeholders after introducing the cost subsidy. The results show that a cost subsidy policy can promote carbon emission-reduction investment and supply chain profit. Thus, it is important to strengthen technical cooperation and exchange among enterprises.

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Production and joint emission reduction decisions based on two-way cost-sharing contract under cap-and-trade regulation

Cited by 81 publications

References 53 publications

Government Low‐Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual‐Channel Supply Chain

Government Low‐Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual‐Channel Supply Chain

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

Supply Chain Investment in Carbon Emission‐Reducing Technology Based on Stochasticity and Low‐Carbon Preferences

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