Profiling Dilithium Digital Signature Traces for Correlation Differential Side Channel Attacks

Fournaris, Apostolos P.; Dimopoulos, Charis; Koufopavlou, O.

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-60939-9_19

Cited by 13 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In CHES 2017, a single-trace attack was performed on the NTT-based polynomial multiplication [PPM17], and it was improved in the later works [PP19, HHP + 21]. Other works on the single-trace side-channel attack have targeted the sampling [EFGT17, KAA21, AKP + ], rejection procedure [FDK20], and message encoding/decoding [SKL + 20, ACLZ20].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Single-Trace Side-Channel Attacks on the Toom-Cook: The Case Study of Saber

Zhu

Huang

et al. 2022

TCHES

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The Toom-Cook method is a well-known strategy for building algorithms to multiply polynomials efficiently. Along with NTT-based polynomial multiplication, Toom-Cook-based or Karatsuba-based polynomial multiplication algorithms still have regained attention since the start of the NIST’s post-quantum standardization procedure. Compared to the comprehensive analysis done for NTT, the leakage characteristics of Toom-Cook have not been discussed. We analyze the vulnerabilities of Toom-Cook in the reference implementation of Saber, a third round finalist of NIST’s post-quantum standardization process. In this work, we present the first single-trace attack based on the soft-analytical side-channel attack (SASCA) targeting the Toom-Cook. The deep learning-based power analysis is combined with SASCA to decrease the number of templates since there are a large number of similar operations in the Toom-Cook. Moreover, we describe the optimized factor graph and improved belief propagation to make the attack more practical. The feasibility of the attack is verified by evaluation experiments. We also discuss the possible countermeasures to prevent the attack.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Single-Trace Side-Channel Attacks on the Toom-Cook: The Case Study of Saber

Zhu

Huang

et al. 2022

TCHES

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“…However, in this case, the attacker can recover the shared symmetric key, not the secret key. Fournaris et al [13] presented a correlation power attacks on the polynomial multiplication operation of CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM signature generation. Their profiling analysis of CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM was performed on ARM Cortex-M4 embedded system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Single-Trace Attack on NIST Round 3 Candidate Dilithium Using Machine Learning-Based Profiling

et al. 2021

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In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM. CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM is a lattice-based digital signature algorithm, one of the third round finalists of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. We attack number-theoretic transform (NTT) in the signing procedure and key generation of CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM to obtain a secret key. When targeting the signing procedure, we can recover both secret key vectors s 1 and s 2 . This enables forgery of signatures. However, only the secret key vector s 1 can be recovered when targeting the key generation. Thus, we additionally attack four operations, sampling, addition, rounding, and packing, to find s 2 . We applied a machine learning-based profiling attack method to find the secret key vectors s 1 and s 2 with a single trace.INDEX TERMS Digital signature, lattice-based cryptography, number-theoretic transform, side-channel attack, machine learning-based profiling attack.

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