2012
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-012-9247-7
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Profit taxes and financing constraints

Abstract: Without financing frictions, profit taxes reduce investment by their effect on the user cost of capital. With financing constraints, investment becomes sensitive to cash-flow. In this situation, even small taxes impose first order welfare losses, and ACE and cash-flow tax systems are no longer neutral. When banks become active and provide monitoring services in addition to finance, an ACE tax yields larger investment and welfare than an equal yield cash-flow tax.JEL-Classification: G38, H25. . We are particula… Show more

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Cited by 33 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…See Keuschnigg and Ribi (2013) and Koethenbuerger and Stimmelmayr (2014) on the role of financial constraints and corporate governance issues in this context.…”
Section: Swiss Corporate Tax Reform Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See Keuschnigg and Ribi (2013) and Koethenbuerger and Stimmelmayr (2014) on the role of financial constraints and corporate governance issues in this context.…”
Section: Swiss Corporate Tax Reform Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The finding relies on inefficiencies associated with decentralized tax choices rather than on corporate agency problems. Keuschnigg and Ribi (2013) show that for cash-constrained firms a cash-flow tax and an ACE tax system are not investment neutral and that bank monitoring influences the welfare effects of corporate taxation. Internal agency conflicts are absent.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…33 With local stability of the Nash equilibrium, the sign of the change in α * * in response to a hike in z follows from ∂α * (m, z)/∂z and the sign of the change in m * * from dm * (α)/dα, implying that the change ∂α * (m, z)/∂m does not influence the qualitative changes in α * * and m * * . 34 Intuitively, a rise in z has a direct effect on α which changes the monitoring intensity as implied by the slope of the bank's best response. Due to the local stability of the Nash equilibrium, any subsequent repercussions will not overturn the first-round adjustments in the level of monitoring and in the sharing rule.…”
Section: Investment Policy Incentive Contracts and Monitoringmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Fazzari et al (1988) and Bond and Meghir (1994b) were the first to discuss the effect of corporate taxation to investment under financial constraints. Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) summarized these considerations in a theoretical model, which includes taxation in a principal agent setting with an investor and a bank.…”
Section: Theory Of Financial Constraints and Corporate Taxationmentioning
confidence: 99%