JEL classification: F23 H21 J64 J65 L23The paper investigates the consequences of outsourcing of labor intensive activities to low-wage economies. This trend challenges the two basic functions of the welfare state, redistribution and social insurance when private unemployment insurance markets are missing. The main results are: (i) outsourcing raises unemployment and labor income risk of unskilled workers; (ii) it increases inequality between high-and low-income groups; and (iii) the gains from outsourcing can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. We finally derive the welfare optimal redistribution and unemployment insurance policies.

Without financing frictions, profit taxes reduce investment by their effect on the user cost of capital. With financing constraints, investment becomes sensitive to cash-flow. In this situation, even small taxes impose first order welfare losses, and ACE and cash-flow tax systems are no longer neutral. When banks become active and provide monitoring services in addition to finance, an ACE tax yields larger investment and welfare than an equal yield cash-flow tax.JEL-Classification: G38, H25. . We are particularly grateful for detailed suggestions and constructive comments by two anonymous referees and the editor, Eckhard Janeba.

The paper investigates the consequences of outsourcing of labor intensive activities to low-wage economies. This trend challenges the two basic functions of the welfare state, redistribution and social insurance when private unemployment insurance markets are missing. The main results are: (i) outsourcing raises unemployment and labor income risk of unskilled workers; (ii) it increases inequality between high-and low-income groups; and (iii) the gains from outsourcing can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. We finally derive the welfare optimal redistribution and unemployment insurance policies.

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This survey of recent research in corporate finance discusses how business taxes, subsidies as well as a country's institutional development affect several important decision margins of heterogeneous firms. We argue that innovative firms, as a result of agency problems between insiders and outside investors, are most frequently finance constrained. We discuss how profit taxes reduce investment of constrained firms by their effect on cash-flow, and of unconstrained firms by their effect on the user cost of capital. Moreover, tax reform as well as tax financed R&D subsidies can enhance aggregate investment, innovation and efficiency by implicitly redistributing profits towards constrained firms where capital earns the highest return. We argue that the corporate legal form improves firms' access to external funds. We then explain the firms' choice between venture capital and bank financing and discuss how business taxation can affect venture capital financing on both the extensive and intensive margins. Finally, we review theory and evidence on how corporate finance may shape a country's comparative advantage in innovative industries as well as aggregate labor market performance when part of firms are finance constrained.