Promoting cooperation by punishing minority

Yang, Huijie; Chen, Xiaojie

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2017.08.049

Cited by 78 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…However, self-regarding individuals constantly strive to maximize their own personal benefit which would inevitably lead to the collapse of cooperation, in the scenario where what is best for the collectivity is at odds with what is best for an individual. This is referred to as social dilemma of cooperation [4,5,6,7], which has received considerable attention in recent years [8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28]. To overcome this conflict social institutions frequently apply two control mechanisms, that is, rewards (positive incentives) for cooperation [29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38] and punishments (negative incentives) for defection [39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49]…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation

Wang

Chen

Szolnoki

2019

Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation

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Prosocial incentive can promote cooperation, but providing incentive is costly. Institutions in human society may prefer to use an incentive strategy which is able to promote cooperation at a reasonable cost. However, thus far few works have explored the optimal institutional incentives which minimize related cost for the benefit of public cooperation. In this work, in combination with optimal control theory we thus formulate two optimal control problems to explore the optimal incentive strategies for institutional reward and punishment respectively. By using the approach of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for well-mixed populations, we theoretically obtain the optimal positive and negative incentive strategies with the minimal cumulative cost respectively. Additionally, we provide numerical examples to verify that the obtained optimal incentives allow the dynamical system to reach the desired destination at the lowest cumulative cost in comparison with other given incentive strategies. Furthermore, we find that the optimal punishing strategy is a cheaper way for obtaining an expected cooperation level when it is compared with the optimal rewarding strategy.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation

Wang

Chen

Szolnoki

2019

Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation

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“…13,19,36,46,50,58 One prominently discussed solution is the employment of pro-social punishment, that is, punishing uncooperative individuals by lowering their income. 11,14,32,33,44,51,54,59,61,69 In particular, two different ways of punishment are studied, namely, peer punishment and pool punishment. The former refers to that group individuals can impose fines on the violators directly and its additional cost.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators

Liu

Chen

Szolnoki

2019

Math. Models Methods Appl. Sci.

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Pro-social punishment is a key driver of harmonious and stable society. However, this institution is vulnerable to corruption since law-violators can avoid sanctioning by paying bribes to corrupt law-enforcers. Consequently, to understand how altruistic behavior survives in a corrupt environment is an open question. To reveal potential explanations here we introduce corrupt enforcers and violators into the public goods game with pool punishment, and assume that punishers, as corrupt enforcers, may select defectors probabilistically to take a bribe from, and meanwhile defectors, as corrupt violators, may select punishers stochastically to be corrupted. By means of mathematical analysis, we aim to study the necessary conditions for the evolution of cooperation in such corrupt environment. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population in two distinct ways. First, cooperators, defectors, and punishers can coexist by all keeping a steady fraction of the population. Second, these three strategies can form a cyclic dominance that resembles a rock-scissors-paper cycle or a heteroclinic cycle. We theoretically identify conditions when the competing strategies coexist in a stationary way or they dominate each other in a cyclic way. These predictions are confirmed numerically.

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“…Similarly, it represents a social dilemma. To investigate this issue, several novel approaches, besides studies addressing known rules [8], have been proposed to explain the appearance and survival of cooperation above so-called social dilemma, such as diversity [9][10][11][12], social influence [13][14][15], reputation [16][17][18][19], conformity [20],co-evolution [21][22][23][24], punishment [25,26], reward [27,28], rubust [29], spatial structure [30], to name but a few. Accordingly, spatial structure, referred to as network reciprocity, is known to have an impact on the evolution of cooperation [31][32][33][34].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of cooperation with individual diversity on interdependent weighted networks

2020

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The social networks as a complex set of networks fully reflect internal relations of individual interactions between them. Individual as an integral part of networks can show different functions under different levels. In the vast majority of current research realm of spatial evolutionary game, individuals who are often treated as identical peers interact with the local neighbours on a single, isolated same network, even the independent networks extended the content of spatial reciprocity. However, the individual diversity, including gender, wealth and social status and so on, usually is presented within the population. Individual heterogeneity impacts on the evolution of cooperation amongst selfish individuals. With this motivation, here we consider that two forms including Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift Game (SG) take place on interdependent weighted networks via the mixed-coupling in which individuals participate in different networks of interactions, cooperative behaviour can be maintained. Remarkably, the numerical analysis shows that, as the network interdependence considering individual diversity increases, cooperation thrives on one network joining in PD, the other engaging in SG may be plagued by defectors. Meanwhile, there exists an optimal region of mixed-coupling between networks to persist in cooperation of one network. Furthermore, individual diversity may be a link between non-trivial systems across the network connection, thus probing in how to schedule heterogeneous competitive tasks and services in complex manufacturing systems.

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Promoting cooperation by punishing minority

Cited by 78 publications

References 54 publications

Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation

Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators

Evolution of cooperation with individual diversity on interdependent weighted networks

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