Promoting Electric Vehicle Cell Innovation Diffusion Considering Patent Licensing Strategy: A Combination of Evolutionary Game and Optimization Algorithm Approach

Abstract

Electric vehicle cell industry is an emerging area with fierce competition on technical innovation, in which the patent holder can choose different innovation diffusion options to maximize the return; however, the strategy is unclear in certain scenarios. We tried to explain the question of how to maximize the patent holder’s return by appropriate patent license strategy to promote EV cell innovation diffusion, when competition and patent licensing relationship exist in the supply chain. A multistage and multichannel diffusion model of EV cell comprising the patent holder, EV cell producer and EV producers is developed; the evolutionary game is analyzed considering the competition among same stage players and patent licensing relationship among different stage players; and an optimization algorithm is introduced to find the maximum weighted object function of the patent holder. We established the multistage and multichannel diffusion model and found a nonlinear complex relationship between patent holder object function and the key factors including patent royalty pricing and innovation advantage coefficient; in addition, an optimization algorithm is developed based on adopters’ decision-making related with competition and patent licensing.

The Evolutionary Game Analysis and Optimization Algorithm of Electric Vehicle Cell Innovation Diffusion Based on a Patent Pool Strategy

“…The critical decision making for optimal licensing strategies requires further study. Similar to [3], we found that the decision-making space included three major directions: adjusting the patent royalty, increasing the advantage coefficient via investment in R&D, and changing the number of patent pool members.…”

“…Sun et al measured China's new energy vehicle patents using a social network analysis approach and suggested that the creation of a patent pool could be a suitable solution to tackle the patent licensing issue in the industry [2]. Sun and Zhang studied a patent licensing strategy to promote the electric vehicle cell innovation diffusion, but the licensor not considering patent pool strategy [3]. Liu et al studied electronic product supply chain patent licensing and outsourcing strategies [4].…”

“…The payoff table was created based on the literature [3,11,13,16]. To simplify the analysis, we ignored factors such as government subsidies and patent pool commission, choosing instead to focus on the patent licensing and market competition cost and benefit factors according to the assumption in Section 3.2.…”

“…Based on the existing literature regarding electric vehicle cell innovation diffusion without a patent pool [3], we extended our analysis to consider patent pool strategy by following the evolutionary game and optimization algorithm approaches, which sets our study apart from others in the literature that consider different industries, different factors, different supply chain structures, or different approaches [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18]. This study contributes to the existing literature on innovation diffusion in the electric vehicle cell industry since it considered a patent pool strategy, established an innovation diffusion channel model, conducted an evolutionary game analysis and simulation, identified the key factors and the interplay between these factors, and developed an optimization algorithm for use by decision-and policymakers.…”

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Farmers’ Conservation Tillage Behavior in Black Soil Areas Guided by Deep Learning

“…e evolutionary stability strategy is the final game result of both sides of the game, and it is a longterm steady-state process, while the replicator dynamic equation represents the process of the steady-state approach of the game direction, which is a time function. Because of the limited degree of rationality of human beings, the choices between the game parties are usually variable, and only after repeated choices by both parties can a satisfactory result be obtained [17][18][19].…”