Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence

Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions

“…When these controls are included, as seen in column 4, the results reveal that the probability of promotion increases with the performance rating in the prepromotion job (i.e., the omitted group is the highest performance category, and the included performance variables have negative coefficients). This result was also found in DeVaro and Waldman () and Cassidy, DeVaro, and Kauhanen ().…”

“…First, we have focused on race as the indicator for whether productivity is publicly observable; however, an alternative indicator is education. Although it is treated only as a control variable in our empirical models, it is the focus of Bernhardt (); DeVaro and Waldman (); Bognanno and Melero (); and Cassidy, DeVaro, and Kauhanen (). Those papers, however, do not explore how educational attainment interacts with the degree of task similarity across job levels, which is an interesting topic for future inquiry.…”

“…Empirical evidence supporting the signaling role of promotions is found in a single‐firm setting in DeVaro and Waldman () and in multifirm panels in Belzil and Bognanno (); Bognanno and Melero (); and Cassidy, DeVaro, and Kauhanen (). Our work differs from DeVaro and Waldman () in three key ways.…”

Human Capital and Career Success: Evidence from Linked Employer‐Employee Data

“… Cassidy et al . () provide similar evidence that schooling is more important for women than men in promotion decisions. …”

Promotion Signaling, Discrimination, and Positive Discrimination Policies

“…It is possible that dominance of a group of workers persists, and these workers are more likely to be promoted than the workers of some other group. A consequence of this assumption is that firms have an incentive to "hide" their Invisibles in the low-level job, implying that these workers are discriminated against with 5 The promotion-signaling model was developed by Waldman (1984) and extended by Bernhardt (1995), Zábojník and Bernhardt (2001), Owan (2004), Ghosh and Waldman (2010), DeVaro and Waldman (2012), DeVaro, Ghosh, and Zoghi (2012), Zábojník (2012), Waldman (2013), Gürtler and Gürtler (2015), Cassidy, DeVaro, and Kauhanen (2016), DeVaro and Kauhanen (2016), Shankar (2016), and Waldman (2016). A worker is promoted if and only if firms have a sufficiently high expectation of the worker's ability.…”