Proof-Carrying Plans

Schwaab, Christopher; Komendantskaya, Ekaterina; Hill, Alisdair; Farka, František; Petrick, Ronald P. A.; Wells, J. B.; Hammond, Kevin

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-05998-9_13

Cited by 6 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Finally, we prove that normalisation is sound and complete: T 9 (S [45,46]). Given a formula F and a world w, it holds that w |= z F iff w ∈ w F ↓ z .…”

Section: E 6 (W F Wmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Proof-Carrying Plans: a Resource Logic for AI Planning

Hill

Komendantskaya

Petrick

2020

Proceedings of the 22nd International Symposium on Principles and Practice of Declarative Programming

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Planning languages have been used successfully in AI for several decades. Recent trends in AI verification and Explainable AI have raised the question of whether AI planning techniques can be verified. In this paper, we present a novel resource logic, the Proof Carrying Plans (PCP) logic that can be used to verify plans produced by AI planners. The PCP logic takes inspiration from existing resource logics (such as Linear logic and Separation logic) as well as Hoare logic when it comes to modelling states and resource-aware plan execution. It also capitalises on the Curry-Howard approach to logics, in its treatment of plans as functions and plan pre-and postconditions as types. This paper presents two main results. From the theoretical perspective, we show that the PCP logic is sound relative to the standard possible world semantics used in AI planning. From the practical perspective, we present a complete Agda formalisation of the PCP logic and of its soundness proof. Moreover, we showcase the Curry-Howard, or functional, value of this implementation by supplementing it with the library that parses AI plans into Agda's proofs automatically. We provide evaluation of this library and the resulting Agda functions.

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“…Finally, we prove that normalisation is sound and complete: T 9 (S [45,46]). Given a formula F and a world w, it holds that w |= z F iff w ∈ w F ↓ z .…”

Section: E 6 (W F Wmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…We first recall the subtyping relation and the override operator on states introduced in [45], and then establish some lemmas about these, which will be useful in the later sections. The lemmas have not appeared in [45]. We omit proofs here, but give them in Agda [20].…”

Section: Subtyping (Order On States)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Proof-Carrying Plans: a Resource Logic for AI Planning

Hill

Komendantskaya

Petrick

2020

Proceedings of the 22nd International Symposium on Principles and Practice of Declarative Programming

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“…types). Accordingly, total functions, f : A -> B, allow for the derivation of evidence that the predicate B can be constructed given evidence of A. Type-checking ensures the soundness of these functions [35]. The syntax of Idris is similar to Haskell [16], and like Haskell, Idris supports algebraic data types with pattern matching, type classes, and do-notation.…”

Section: Dependent Typesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Semi-automatic ladderisation: improving code security through rewriting and dependent types

Brown

Barwell

Marquer

et al. 2022

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on Partial Evaluation and Program Manipulation

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Cyber attacks become more and more prevalent every day. One type of cyber attack is known as a side channel attack, where attackers exploit information leakage from the physical execution of a program, e.g. timing or power leakage, to uncover secret information, such as encryption keys or other sensitive data. There have been various attempts at addressing the problem of preventing side-channel attacks, often relying on various measures to decrease the discernibility of several code variants or code paths. Most techniques require a high-degree of expertise by the developer, who often employs ad hoc, hand-crafted code-patching in an attempt to make it more secure. In this paper, we take a different approach: building on the idea of ladderisation, inspired by Montgomery Ladders. We present a semi-automatic toolsupported technique, aimed at the non-specialised developer, which refactors (a class of) C programs into functionally (and even algorithmically) equivalent counterparts with improved security properties. Our approach provides refactorings that transform the source code into its ladderised equivalent, driven by an underlying verified rewrite system, based on dependent types. Our rewrite system automatically finds rewritings of selected C expressions, facilitating the production of their equivalent ladderised counterparts for a subset of C. We demonstrate our approach on a number of representative examples from the cryptographic domain, showing increased security.

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Section: Dependent Typesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, we demonstrate our executable formalisation on a representative example, capturing a range of programmer-provided assertions and non-functional properties, and demonstrable proofs of these assertions. In line with the Curry-Howard correspondence [28,30], we formulate our definitions of…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A trustworthy framework for resource-aware embedded programming

Barwell

Brown

2019

Proceedings of the 31st Symposium on Implementation and Application of Functional Languages

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Systems with non-functional requirements, such as Energy, Time and Security (ETS), are of increasing importance due to the proliferation of embedded devices with limited resources such as drones, wireless sensors, and tablet computers. Currently, however, there are little to no programmer supported methodologies or frameworks to allow them to reason about ETS properties in their source code. Drive is one such existing framework supporting the developer by lifting non-functional properties to the source-level through the Contract Specification Language (CSL), allowing non-functional properties to be first-class citizens, and supporting programmerwritten code-level contracts to guarantee the non-functional specifications of the program are met. In this paper, we extend the Drive system by providing rigorous implementations of the underlying proof-engine, modeling the specification of the annotations and assertions from CSL for a representative subset of C, called Imp. We define both an improved abstract interpretation that automatically derives proofs of assertions, and define inference algorithms for the derivation of both abstract interpretations and the context over which the interpretation is indexed. We use the dependentlytyped programming language, Idris, to give a formal definition, and implementation, of our abstract interpretation. Finally, we show our well-formed abstract interpretation over some representative exemplars demonstrating provable assertions of ETS.

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Proof-Carrying Plans

Cited by 6 publications

References 17 publications

Proof-Carrying Plans: a Resource Logic for AI Planning

Proof-Carrying Plans: a Resource Logic for AI Planning

Semi-automatic ladderisation: improving code security through rewriting and dependent types

A trustworthy framework for resource-aware embedded programming

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