Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?

Bello, Marcello Di

doi:10.1093/mind/fzz021

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…: n. 14. 67 For an analogous argument to that in the text, see Di Bello, 2019. For a critique of Smith's arguments that is at least sympathetic to some of the arguments here, see Michael Blome-Tillmann (2020).…”

Section: Enoch Et Al Recognize the Limitations Of The Incentive Argumentioning

confidence: 92%

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Allen

2020

SSRN Journal

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This article revisits «Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence», published twenty years ago. The evolution of the relative plausibility theory of juridical proof is offered as evidence of the advantage of a naturalized approach to the study of the field and law of evidence. Various alternative explanations of juridical proof from other disciplines are examined and their shortcomings described. These competing explanations are similar in their reductive, a priori approaches that are at odds with an empirically oriented naturalized approach. The shortcomings of the various a priori approaches are driven by their common methodological commitments to employing weird hypotheticals to engage in intuition mining about the American legal systems that in turn ignore important aspects of the actual legal systems and consistently make impossible epistemological demands. As a result, both their descriptions of and prescriptions for American legal systems are implausible, unlike the relative plausibility theory.

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Section: Enoch Et Al Recognize the Limitations Of The Incentive Argumentioning

confidence: 92%

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Allen

2020

SSRN Journal

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“…What deprives the bus statistics of normic support deprives all evidence of 66 Ibid n. 14. 67 For an analogous argument to that in the text, see Di Bello, 2019. For a critique of Smith's arguments that is at least sympathetic to some of the arguments here, see Michael Blome-Tillmann (2020).…”

Section: Quaestio Facti Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Promentioning

confidence: 93%

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Allen

2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article revisits Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, published twenty years ago. The evolution of the relative plausibility theory of juridical proof is offered as evidence of the advantage of a naturalized approach to the study of the field and law of evidence. Various alternative explanations of juridical proof from other disciplines are examined and their shortcomings described. These competing explanations are similar in their reductive, a priori approaches that are at odds with an empirically oriented naturalized approach. The shortcomings of the various a priori approaches are driven by their common methodological commitments to employing weird hypotheticals to engage in intuition mining about the American legal systems that in turn ignore important aspects of the actual legal systems and consistently make impossible epistemological demands. As a result, both their descriptions of and prescriptions for American legal systems are implausible, unlike the relative plausibility theory.

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“…First, epistemologists in this debate often overestimate the extent to which the legal practice treats purely statistical evidence as insufficient for meeting the standard of proof, thereby failing to provide an accurate description of how the law works (Di Bello (2019); Ross (2019); Spottswood forthcoming). Similarly, one might worry that tackling the proof paradox as if it were a descriptive project might lead to overestimate the extent to which testimony alone is sufficient for meeting the standard of proof, e.g., in criminal cases.…”

Section: Preliminary Reasons To Be Suspicious Of the Epistemic Projectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project

Fratantonio

2021

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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Why can testimony alone be enough for findings of liability? Why statistical evidence alone can't? These questions underpin the ‘Proof Paradox’. Many epistemologists have attempted to explain this paradox from a purely epistemic perspective. I call it the ‘Epistemic Project’. In this paper, I take a step back from this recent trend. Stemming from considerations about the nature and role of standards of proof, I define three requirements that any successful account in line with the Epistemic Project should meet. I then consider three recent epistemic accounts on which the standard is met when the evidence rules out modal risk (Pritchard 2018), normic risk (Ebert et al., 2020), or relevant alternatives (Gardiner 2019 2020). I argue that none of these accounts meets all the requirements. Finally, I offer reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects of having a successful epistemic explanation of the paradox. I suggest the discussion on the proof paradox would benefit from undergoing a ‘value-turn’.

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Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?

Cited by 8 publications

References 28 publications

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project

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