Property Attribution in Metaphor Comprehension

Glucksberg, Sam; McGlone, Matthew S.; Manfredi, Deanna Ann

doi:10.1006/jmla.1996.2479

Cited by 210 publications

(189 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…These findings are inconsistent with the prediction of initially asymmetrical, role-specific processing made by Glucksberg, McGlone, and Manfredi's (1997) attributive categorization model . If the vehicle and the topic of a metaphor contribute differently to the metaphor's interpretation from the beginning, then the reversed metaphors,'which do not afford appropriate interaction of potential categories and potential dimensions, should not create interference .…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

“…Metaphors are clearly directional ; there is abundant evidence that reversing metaphors affects their perceived aptness and interpretability (Gentner & Clement, 1988 ;Glucksberg et al, 1997 ;Ortony, 1979 ;Ortony et al ., 1985) . But when and how does this asymmetry come about?…”

Section: Directionality In Metaphor Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A second account of metaphoric directionality, Glucksberg et al's (1997) attributive categorization model, states that there is a processing asymmetry. Processing begins simultaneously with both terms but is differentiated from the start in role-specific ways .…”

Section: Directionality In Metaphor Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evidence for role-neutral initial processing of metaphors.

Wolff¹,

Gentner²

2000

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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Two models of metaphor processing are contrasted. The structure-mapping model postulates an initially role-neutral alignment process, followed by directional projection of inferences. The attributive categorization model postulates role-specific processing throughout comprehension . To test between these models, the early stages of metaphor comprehension were probed using a technique based on S. Glucksberg, P Gildea, and H. Bookin's (1982) finding that metaphorical meaning interferes with literal truthfulness judgments. In Experiment 1, interference effects did not differ between normal metaphors and metaphors with reversed terms, suggesting that initial processing is role-neutral. In Experiment 2, we again found no role dependence in interference effects, even for highly conventional metaphors. In Experiment 3, it was verified that (a) full comprehension is role-sensitive and (b) full comprehension reaction times (RTs) are far longer than interference RTs, buttressing the claim that interference is an early-stage effect. Overall, the results support the structure-mapping model of metaphor processing. Metaphors both highlight commonalities and invite new inferences. Whereas finding commonalities can be conceived of as a symmetrical matching process, the inference projection process is by nature asymmetrical ; information is directionally projected from the vehicle (or base) to the topic (target). For example, in a nominal metaphor such as A rumor is a virus, ideas such as contagion that are normally associated with the vehicle concept, virus, are projected to the topic concept, rumor. The role specificity of metaphoric processing is revealed when the ordering of the terms is changed (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990 ; Miller, 1993 ; Ortony, 1979 ; Ortony, Vondruska, Foss, & Jones, 1985). For example , if the terms of the aforementioned metaphor are reversed, the resulting statement, A virus is a rumor, seems pointless. In other cases, reversing the terms produces a change in meaning. For example, the metaphor My surgeon is a butcher suggests cutting sloppily, whereas its reversal, My butcher is a surgeon, suggests cutting precisely. Models of metaphor and analogy differ in their assumptions as to when in processing this asymmetry appears. The key dichotomy here is between models that explain metaphors in terms of comparison processing and models that explain metaphors in terms of category processing .

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

Section: Directionality In Metaphor Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evidence for role-neutral initial processing of metaphors.

Wolff¹,

Gentner²

2000

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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“…The final outcome is the same as without the prime, however. This agrees with the experimental findings of Glucksberg, Manfredini, and McGlone (1997) that people take more time to understand the primed metaphor, but arrive at the intended interpretation eventually. to settle, versus 11 in the context of the metaphorical prime.…”

Section: Metaphors Are In Principle Non-reversible This Is Actually supporting

confidence: 91%

La comprensión del discurso especializado escrito en ámbitos técnico-profesionales: ¿Aprendiendo a partir del texto?

Parodi

2005

Rev. signos

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The rich body of experimental results that has appeared in the psychological literature in recent years (for reviews, see Cacciari & Glucksberg, 1994;Gibbs, 1994a) has changed our understanding of how non-literal statements such as metaphors are comprehended. Prior to that work the dominant view was that the comprehension of nonliteral statements involves two steps: first, it must be recognized that the statement makes no sense if interpreted literally; then its intended, non-literal meaning is computed by some kind of inference. Now we know that, instead, metaphors can be understood directly, like literal statements. A computational model of literal comprehension should therefore be able to understand metaphorical statements in the same way that it "understands" literal sentences.In this paper I shall sketch a computational model of metaphor comprehension that treats metaphors in the same way as literal statements. I introduce this model with an example that Glucksberg used to present his view that metaphorical predication is basically the same as literal predication (Glucksberg, 1998). According to Glucksberg, the metaphor My lawyer is a shark is a regular class-inclusion assertion, except that "the metaphor vehicle (shark) is used to refer to the superordinate category of predatory creatures in general, not to the smaller, concrete category of marine creatures that is also named shark" (Glucksberg, 1998, p. 41). Thus, the metaphorical shark-propertiesvicious, predatory, aggressive, and tenacious -are attributed to lawyer, but the literal shark-properties -fast swimmer, has fins, has sharp teeth, has leathery skin, has gillsare not. The goal of the present paper is to show how such a process can be realized computationally. Metaphorical Predication 1If metaphors are understood by people in much the same way as literal sentences, then metaphorical predication becomes a special case of predication in general. In this paper, a general computational theory of predication, which has recently been proposed by Kintsch (submitted), will be applied to simulate metaphor comprehension. This

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“…In contrast to the standard model, current processing models of metaphor comprehension all assume that literal and nonliteral language comprehension invoke the same mechanisms (Gibbs, 1994;Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997;Wolff & Gentner, 2000). These mechanisms include one's noting the potential correspondence between semantic attributes or relational structure associated with the source and target domains (alignment) and a selective projection of properties from one to the other (Shen, 1999).…”

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confidence: 99%

Conceptual integration and metaphor: An event-related potential study

2002

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Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded from 18 normal adults as they read sentences that ended with words used literally, metaphorically, or in an intermediate literal mapping condition. In the latter condition, the literal sense of the word was used in a way that prompted readers to map conceptual structure from a different domain. ERPs measured from 300 to 500 msec after the onset of the sentence-final words differed as a function of metaphoricity: Literal endings elicited the smallest N400, metaphors the largest N400, whereas literal mappings elicitedan N400 of intermediate amplitude.Metaphoric endings also elicited a larger posterior positivity than did either literal or literal mapping words. Consistent with conceptual blending theory, the results suggest that the demands of conceptual integration affect the difficulty of both literal and metaphorical language.

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Property Attribution in Metaphor Comprehension

Cited by 210 publications

References 6 publications

Evidence for role-neutral initial processing of metaphors.

Evidence for role-neutral initial processing of metaphors.

La comprensión del discurso especializado escrito en ámbitos técnico-profesionales: ¿Aprendiendo a partir del texto?

Conceptual integration and metaphor: An event-related potential study

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