Property Enforcement as Organized Consent

Securing rural land transactions in Africa. An Ivorian perspective

“…However, the issue usually remains framed within a land title or certificate registration paradigm, i.e. the record of rights and duties that an identified legal entity holds over a given piece of land, whereas recording dealings can be seen as an alternative to such procedures (Mathieu, 2001;Arruñada, 2003;Fitzpatrick, 2005;Kanji et al, 2005;Comby, 2007). A system of registration of rights requires a previous and complete purge of property rights, so that registered rights are considered as conclusive -they are rights in rem, valid against all people; there is no legal uncertainty regarding who the right holder is and the precise nature of the right.…”

“…A system of registration of rights requires a previous and complete purge of property rights, so that registered rights are considered as conclusive -they are rights in rem, valid against all people; there is no legal uncertainty regarding who the right holder is and the precise nature of the right. A deed recording system simply makes private contracts public, producing only contractual rights, valid specifically against the partner in the transaction (Arruñada, 2003). The deed recording system is sometimes viewed as less costly but also less effective than the title registration system (see references in Arruñada, 2003), but empirical evidences shed very serious doubts with respect to the effectiveness of registration systems in a number of empirical situations (see cases and references in Colin et al, 2009b).…”

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

“…Conveyancers are motivated to prevent potential damage to the contractual parties, but only to the extent that effective control may be performed subsequently by judges (under recording) or it is performed immediately by registers (under registration). Arruñada (2003a), which is the basis for this section, clarifies this crucial distinction, one that is often overlooked (for instance, by Van den Bergh and Montangie 2006a and b). It also reinforces the argument in Arruñada (1996) that the comparative advantage of notaries lies in the economies of scope reached by impartial lawyering, which is often artificially forbidden by the Bar in common law countries (see n. 19).…”

“…Indeed, conveyancers have often managed to impede the development of registers, monopolizing entry into existing registers or debasing their legal effects-for instance, by reinforcing the effects of possession or title deeds against those of the register. 11 Partly as a consequence of this, many real systems are hybrids in transition (Arruñada 2003a, b). In particular, registration systems are often plagued by the presence of ''overriding interests'': rights which are enforced in rem despite not being registered (for instance, due taxes and possessory rights) or rights filed in separate administrative registers (as typically happens with municipalities' zoning and preemption rights).…”

Organizing public good provision: Lessons from Managerial Accounting

“…As a consequence, transaction costs in future deals are usually greater. Reformers in the past were conscious that placing the registers within the realm of the courts or the Ministry of Justice (Germany, Spain) was well-suited to their primary goal of making the register a facilitator of private contracting (Arruñada, 2003).…”