The economic literature on con ‡ict employs a static game theoretic framework developed by Jack Hirshleifer. We extend this literature by explicitly introducing con ‡ict dynamics into the model. Our speci…c application is based on two stylized facts. First, con ‡ict often arises over scarce renewable resources, and second those resources often lack well-de…ned and/or enforceable property rights. Our stylized model features two rival groups, each dependent on a single contested renewable resource. Each period, the groups allocate their members between resource harvesting and resource appropriation (or con ‡ict) in order to maximize their income. This leads to a complex non-linear dynamic interaction between con ‡ict, the two populations, and the resource. The system's steady states are identi…ed and comparative statics are computed. As developed, the model relates most closely to con ‡ict over renewable resources in primitive societies. The system's global dynamics are investigated in simulations calibrated for the historical society of Easter Island. The model's implications for contemporary lesser developed societies are examined.