Property rules: State fragmentation, industry heterogeneity and property rights in the Russian oil industry, 1992—2006

Abstract

The study examines the interdependence between the state and organizations and develops a proposition that the fragmentation of state structure and industry heterogeneity (defined as the number of organizations and organizational forms) are mutually conducive. The investigation focuses on property rights as an important arena of state—organization interaction and explores how, through the development of rules regarding obJect, subJect, use, enforcement and transfer of property, the state and the industry shape each other. Case study analysis of the Russian oil industry in 1992—2006 shows how the property rights relations between the state and the oil industry affected the U-shaped traJectories of change both in the state structure (from increasing to decreasing fragmentation on spatial and functional dimensions) and in the industry structure (from increasing to decreasing heterogeneity).

Vertreibt Privatisierung den Ressourcenfluch?

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Organizational responses to political sanctions: Voluntary state co-optation and strategic acquiescence in China’s futures market

“…Centrally, hypotheses relating to guanxi have often assumed the notion of 'connection for protection', suggesting the achievement of reduced environmental uncertainty for organizations that engage meaningfully with government and enlist its support (Gold et al, 2002;Keister, 2002;Wank, 2001). Other research, however, has illuminated the often complicated, ambiguous and dynamic relationships between firms and government in this regard (Den Hond et al, 2014;Jiang et al, 2016;Suhomlinova, 2007;Wilson, 2009). In politically contested fields, for example, the skilful manoeuvring of ideology can be realized through processes of rhetorically intense argumentation, elite political networking, coalition-building and cultivating officialdom, with these factors all relevant to explaining the dynamics of CPA.…”

Does Illegitimate Corporate Behaviour Follow the Forms of Polity? The Turkish Experience

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