This paper revisits the multi-agent epistemic logic presented in [10], where agents and sets of agents are replaced by abstract, intensional "names". We make three contributions. First, we study its model theory, providing adequate notions of bisimulation and frame morphisms, and use them to study the logic's expressive power and definability. Second, we show that the logic has a natural neighborhood semantics, which in turn allows to show that the axiomatization in [10] does not rely on possibly controversial introspective properties of knowledge. Finally, we extend the logic with common and distributed knowledge operators, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for each of these extensions. These results together put the original epistemic logic with names in a more modern context and opens the door for a logical analysis of epistemic phenomena where group membership is uncertain or variable.In [10], Grove and Halpern studied a generalized version of multi-agents epistemic logic where the usual labels for agents and sets of agents are replaced by abstract names whose extension might vary from state to state. 1 Despite being interpreted in standard multi-agents epistemic models, the resulting language does away with the familiar K i modalities, and instead contains two families of epistemic operators: S n , standing for "someone with name n knows", and E n , standing for "everyone with name n knows". This generalization is conceptually important. The "names" that index the S n and the E n modalities can refer intensionally to both individuals and groups. Since these extensions are not fixed in a given model, the logic allows to study social-epistemic phenomena that involve uncertainty or variability in the agents' identities or group membership. These phenomena are pervasive. [19,10] already provide convincing examples for distributed systems. Massive coordinated actions or social movements, especially online, also provide contemporary cases [1,4], where for instance we refer to group labels like "Trump supporters" or "trolls" without knowing exactly who the members of these groups are or even failing to know whether we, ourselves, are members of those groups. 2 The study in [10], however, focuses on the two modalities mentioned above, and in particular leaves aside notions of common and distributed knowledge. These notions are, however, central to theories of social conventions [16,2] and collective action [25].[19] study a closely related notion of common knowledge, to which we come back briefly in Section 4, but do not provide an axiomatization. Distributed knowledge for intensional or indexical group names has been studied in [20], but in a more expressive language with explicit quantification.