Prospective Cryptography in NFC with the Lightweight Block Encryption Algorithm LEA

Nguyen, Ha Van; Seo, Hwajeong; Kim, Howon

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-12778-1_15

Cited by 5 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Suppose the attacker injects a fault n times into an encryption process that uses a fixed plaintext. If the i-th fault injection equation is expressed as A (B ⊕ ∆B i ) = C ⊕ ∆C i where 0 < i ≤ n, n fault injections are expressed by the following system of equations (5).…”

Section: A Analysis Of Modular Additionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This system of equations can be solved using the theories introduced in Sections II-D and II-E. First, each equation is represented as a binary-system of equations over GF (2). The system of equations (5), which was composed of (n + 1) equations over GF 2 32 , is transformed into a binary-system of equations composed of 32 × (n + 1) equations over GF (2) as shown in the system of equations (6).…”

Section: A Analysis Of Modular Additionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…RK 23 [5] RK 23 [ In addition, C and C can be calculated through ciphertexts. The attacker can reveal the lower 31 [1].…”

Section: B Proposed Dfa Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The attacker has no information about RK 23 [5]. There-fore, RK 23 [5] must be estimated. To reduce RK 23 [5] candidates, the attacker needs to know information about X 23 [3].…”

Section: B Proposed Dfa Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper targets the ARX-based lightweight block cipher LEA [3]. When operating cryptographic algorithms in resource-scarce environments, the LEA has proven to be much more advantageous than the AES [4], [5], [6]. The LEA is guarantee security against traditional cryptanalysis [7], [8]; however, its vulnerability to SCA needs more consideration.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Improved Differential Fault Attack on LEA by Algebraic Representation of Modular Addition

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recently, as the number of IoT (Internet of Things) devices has increased, the use of lightweight cryptographic algorithms that are suitable for environments with scarce resources has also increased. Consequently, the safety of such cryptographic algorithms is becoming increasingly important. Among them, side-channel analysis methods are very realistic threats. In this paper, we propose a novel differential fault attack method on the Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA) cipher which became the ISO/IEC international standard lightweight cryptographic algorithm in 2019. Previously proposed differential fault attack methods on the LEA used the Single Bit Flip model, making it difficult to apply to real devices. The proposed attack method uses a more realistic attacker assumption, the Random Word Error model. We demonstrate that the proposed attack method can be implemented on real devices using an electromagnetic fault injection setup. Our attack method has the weakest attacker assumption among attack methods proposed to date. In addition, the number of required fault-injected ciphertexts and the number of key candidates for which exhaustive search is performed are the least among all existing methods. Therefore, when implementing the LEA cipher on IoT deivces, designers must apply appropriate countermeasures against fault injection attacks.

show abstract

Section: A Analysis Of Modular Additionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Analysis Of Modular Additionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…RK 23 [5] RK 23 [ In addition, C and C can be calculated through ciphertexts. The attacker can reveal the lower 31 [1].…”

Section: B Proposed Dfa Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The attacker has no information about RK 23 [5]. There-fore, RK 23 [5] must be estimated. To reduce RK 23 [5] candidates, the attacker needs to know information about X 23 [3].…”

Section: B Proposed Dfa Schemementioning

confidence: 99%