Protecting Power: How Western States Retain The Dominant Voice in The World Bank’s Governance

Vestergaard, Jakob; Wade, Robert

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.031

Cited by 78 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…A third interpretation -even more critical -views mechanisms such as the IP as visible symbols meant to divert attention from the World Bank's governance failures and to both obscure and maintain an imperialist Western agenda (Vestergaard and Wade, 2013). In such a complex and multi-scalar system, the IP asserts its power and independence but remains limited by countervailing pressures from the WBG (the board and management) and influenced by external factors such as perceptions among civil society groups and continuous efforts to improve accountability at other international financial institutions.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disequilibrium in Development Finance: The Contested Politics of Institutional Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank Inspection Panel

Sovacool¹,

Fourie²,

Tan‐Mullins³

2018

Development and Change

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This article examines the dynamic nature with which independent accountability mechanisms operate. Focusing on the World Bank, the authors argue that its Inspection Panel evolves according to internal and external pressures. In seeking to achieve equilibrium, and protect its authority and independence, the Panel has gone through several distinct phases: negotiation, emergence, protracted resistance, assertion of independence and authority, renewed tension, and contestation. The core novelty of the article is its application of concepts from outside the field of development studies -notably institutional accountability from the governance literature, and judicialization from the legal studies literature -to the topic of the Inspection Panel. Examining the Panel in this way demonstrates that accountability mechanisms represent a hybrid of transnational governance influenced by a range of actors including project-affected peoples, national governments, managers and development donors. Accountability in development finance is about competing interests as well as competing conceptions and expectations of accountability. In such a complex and multi-scalar system, the Panel is not only concerned with delivering well-researched investigation reports; it is also an entity seeking to ensure its own survival, as well as an arbiter of its own brand of legitimacy and accountability.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disequilibrium in Development Finance: The Contested Politics of Institutional Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank Inspection Panel

Sovacool¹,

Fourie²,

Tan‐Mullins³

2018

Development and Change

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“…Clearly, these two types of flexibility are related: the better the representation of rising powers in IO decision‐making is, the more likely their issues will appear in IO policies and programs. To date, however, the BICs remain under‐represented in Bank and Fund decision‐making relative to developed states (Lesage et al., ; Vestergaard and Wade, ). Consequently, we operationalize each dimension of flexibility separately in this contribution to gain a more nuanced understanding of how flexibility affects rising power support for IOE.…”

Section: Linking Flexibility With Bic Support For Empowermentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus

Heldt

Mahrenbach

2018

Global Policy

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Given long‐standing criticism of global economic institutions by rising powers, it is puzzling that these same governments supported the transfer of substantial resources and responsibilities to the IMF and the World Bank during recent reform negotiations. We argue rising powers’ support for international organization (IO) empowerment is linked to their concerns regarding an IO's flexibility. We introduce two types of flexibility as being most relevant for rising powers. These include governance flexibility – the extent to which rising powers may participate in IO decision‐making – and issue flexibility – the extent to which rising power preferences are incorporated into IO policies and programs. We illustrate our argument by examining the preferences of the BIC states (Brazil, India and China) towards IMF and World Bank reforms between 2008 and 2012. Drawing on archival material with over 50 statements from BIC representatives, we find, first, that there were clear links between Bank and Fund governance flexibility and the BICs’ support for empowerment of these IOs, but that this was not true for issue flexibility. Second, we find evidence indicating the strategies of individual BIC governments differ within these IOs, suggesting a need to undertake more differentiated studies of rising powers’ IO activities.

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“…The IMF saga is a kind of re‐run of what happened earlier in the World Bank as it struggled to shift voting shares towards developing countries. The World Bank saga, too, reveals (1) exaggerated claims about agreement on big shifts of voting power; (2) Europeans resisting any significant changes on grounds that, if anything, they are underrepresented; (3) continuing large voting power imbalances post agreement; and (4) no agreement on how shares should be allocated in future (Vestergaard and Wade, ).…”

Section: World Bank Voice Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk

Vestergaard

Wade

2014

Global Policy

Self Cite

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The Western hegemony of the past 200 years is ending as power shifts towards the East and as Western states lose the authority to uphold a rules-based multilateral order. In the wake of the Great Crash of 2008 the G20 leaders took steps to bolster the multilateral order, including reform of the governance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank so as to reflect the increasing economic weight of developing countries. The executive boards of both organizations affirmed that the primary criterion for allocating voting shares should be shares of world GDP. We show that the reforms at the IMF and the World Bank have substantially failed to meet their ostensible objectives. First, in both organizations the developed countries gained voting share relative to GDP share between 2009 and 2014. Second, countries continue to vary widely in their share of votes relative to share of world GDP; in both organizations some countries have six times or more the votes relative to GDP of others. Politicians and analysts should give attention to achieving more equitable governance in these important multilateral organizations. At the end of this article we show how this could be done. Policy Implications• To strengthen the multilateral order the Bretton Woods organizations should make a more determined effort than hitherto to adapt their governance structures to changes in the relative economic importance of countries.

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Protecting Power: How Western States Retain The Dominant Voice in The World Bank’s Governance

Cited by 78 publications

References 6 publications

Disequilibrium in Development Finance: The Contested Politics of Institutional Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank Inspection Panel

Disequilibrium in Development Finance: The Contested Politics of Institutional Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank Inspection Panel

Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus

Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk

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