Protecting secret keys with personal entropy

Ellison, Carl M.; Hall, Chris; Milbert, Randy; Schneier, Bruce

doi:10.1016/s0167-739x(99)00055-2

Cited by 75 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Shannon's entropy [19], [20], [21] has been widely used in many disciplines, such as sensor networks [22], cryptography [23], and preference-based authentication [24]. Our quantifying activity fundamentally differs from the analysis by Jakobbson, Yang, and Wetzel on quantifying preferences [24], because of the diversity and dynamic-nature of personal activities in our model.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

Role-Playing Game for Studying User Behaviors in Security: A Case Study on Email Secrecy

Xu¹,

Yao²,

Pérez-Quiñones³

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing

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Abstract-Understanding the capabilities of adversaries (e.g., how much the adversary knows about a target) is important for building strong security defenses. Computing an adversary's knowledge about a target requires new modeling techniques and experimental methods. Our work describes a quantitative analysis technique for modeling an adversary's knowledge about private information at workplace. Our technical enabler is a new emulation environment for conducting user experiments on attack behaviors. We develop a role-playing cyber game for our evaluation, where the participants take on the adversary role to launch ID theft attacks by answering challenge questions about a target. We measure an adversary's knowledge based on how well he or she answers the authentication questions about a target. We present our empirical modeling results based on the data collected from a total of 36 users.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

Role-Playing Game for Studying User Behaviors in Security: A Case Study on Email Secrecy

Xu¹,

Yao²,

Pérez-Quiñones³

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing

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“…Interestingly, the noisy polynomial interpolation and the polynomial reconstruction problems also appeared in password authentication schemes [25,13]. Both schemes use Shamir's secret sharing scheme based on Lagrange's polynomial interpolation, where the shares are encrypted with low entropy secrets.…”

Section: S3 S2mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Shamir's scheme achieves perfect security, but here, additional information is available to the attacker. A closer inspection shows that [13] is based on the noisy polynomial interpolation problem, and is therefore insecure for many choices of the parameters. For instance, the authors propose to use n = 22, k = 14 and m ≈ 256 to protect a 112-bit key.…”

Section: S3 S2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Noisy Polynomial Interpolation and Noisy Chinese Remaindering

Bleichenbacher¹,

Nguyêñ

2000

Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2000

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Abstract. The noisy polynomial interpolation problem is a new intractability assumption introduced last year in oblivious polynomial evaluation. It also appeared independently in password identification schemes, due to its connection with secret sharing schemes based on Lagrange's polynomial interpolation. This paper presents new algorithms to solve the noisy polynomial interpolation problem. In particular, we prove a reduction from noisy polynomial interpolation to the lattice shortest vector problem, when the parameters satisfy a certain condition that we make explicit. Standard lattice reduction techniques appear to solve many instances of the problem. It follows that noisy polynomial interpolation is much easier than expected. We therefore suggest simple modifications to several cryptographic schemes recently proposed, in order to change the intractability assumption. We also discuss analogous methods for the related noisy Chinese remaindering problem arising from the well-known analogy between polynomials and integers.

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“…Two recent papers that are related in a technical sense are those of Monrose, Reiter and Wetzel [23] who used similar methods for strengthening login sessions by measuring typing speeds; and Ellison, Hall, Milbert and Schneier [10], who suggested a method for "fuzzy" passphrase based logins, where only a certain portion of the passphrase needs to be correct. Whereas the former employs techniques believed to be resistant against lattice-based attacks (see e.g., [7,25,33]), the latter has been found to be susceptible to such attacks, as recently pointed out by Bleichenbacher [4].…”

Section: Overview Of Forensic Dna Techniques and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptographic Approaches to Privacy in Forensic DNA Databases

Bohannon

Jakobsson

Srikwan

2000

Public Key Cryptography

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Abstract. Advances in DNA sequencing technology and human genetics are leading to the availability of inexpensive genetic tests, notably tests for individual predisposition to certain diseases. While such information is often valuable, its availability has raised serious concerns over the privacy of genetic information. These concerns are further heightened when genetic information is gathered into databases. We study access control for one class of such databases, forensic DNA databases, used to match unknown perpetrators against groups of potential suspectsusually convicted criminals. Our key observation is that for legitimate forensic queries, the sensitive information belonging to the target individual is already available to the querying agent in the form of a blood or tissue sample from a crime scene. We show how forensic DNA databases may be implemented so that only legitimate queries are feasible. In particular, a person with unlimited access to the database will be unable to extract information about any individual unless the necessary genetic information for that individual is already known. We develop a general solution framework, and show how to implement databases which handle certain cases of missing or incorrect DNA tests. Our framework and techniques are applicable to the general problem of encrypting information based on partially known or partially correct keys, and its security is based on standard cryptographic assumptions.

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Protecting secret keys with personal entropy

Cited by 75 publications

References 2 publications

Role-Playing Game for Studying User Behaviors in Security: A Case Study on Email Secrecy

Role-Playing Game for Studying User Behaviors in Security: A Case Study on Email Secrecy

Noisy Polynomial Interpolation and Noisy Chinese Remaindering

Cryptographic Approaches to Privacy in Forensic DNA Databases

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