Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Bresson, Emmanuel; Chevassut, Olivier; Pointcheval, David; Quisquater, Jean-Jacques

doi:10.1145/501983.502018

Cited by 251 publications

(145 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Bresson et al [10] were the first to formalize the security model for group key agreement protocols. Their model is based on the previous security model for key agreement protocols between two or three parties [1,2,4].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Identity-Based Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement Protocol

Zhang

Qin

et al. 2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. In identity-based public-key cryptography, an entity's public key can be easily derived from its identity. The direct derivation of public keys in identity-based public-key cryptography eliminates the need for certificates and solves certain public key management problems in traditional public-key cryptosystems. Recently, the notion of asymmetric group key agreement was introduced, in which the group members merely negotiate a common encryption key which is accessible to any entity, but they hold respective secret decryption keys. In this paper, we first propose a security model for identity-based authenticated asymmetric group key agreement (IB-AAGKA) protocols. We then propose an IB-AAGKA protocol which is proven secure under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption. Our protocol is also efficient, and readily adaptable to provide broadcast encryption.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first security model for AGKA protocols was presented by Wu et al [25], derived from the security model for conventional GKA protocols [10]. We note that the security model in [25] only considers passive attackers.…”

Section: Security Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identity-Based Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement Protocol

Zhang

Qin

et al. 2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Security of key exchange protocols is usually defined with the requirement of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) security; see [3,14,15,26] for the 2KE case and [8,10,18,21,22] for the GKE case. AKE-security models the indistinguishability of the established session group key with respect to an active adversary treated as an external entity from the perspective of the attacked session.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words the simulation aborts if A outputs a successful forgery. Following the classical reductionist argument (see for instance [8]) we can build a forger against the signature scheme and upper-bound the probability difference…”

Section: A Proof Of Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The required independence between different key types imposes further security challenges on GKE+S protocols: The classical GKE security requirement concerning the secrecy of the group key with respect to the external parties (typically called AKE-security [8,22]) should now be preserved even if some subgroup keys leak, and the independence of any subgroup key implicitly requires us to handle (collusion) attacks from parties that are external to that subgroup but internal to the preliminary computation process of the common group key or to a different subgroup with membership overlap. As a result, the specification of the adequate security requirements for GKE+S protocols with respect to these threats appears to be an interesting task from a formal point of view.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Flexible Group Key Exchange with On-demand Computation of Subgroup Keys

Abdalla

Chevalier

Manulis

et al. 2010

Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2010

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Abstract. Modern multi-user communication systems, including popular instant messaging tools, social network platforms, and cooperative-work applications, offer flexible forms of communication and exchange of data. At any time point concurrent communication sessions involving different subsets of users can be invoked. The traditional tool for achieving security in a multi-party communication environment are group key exchange (GKE) protocols that provide participants with a secure group key for their subsequent communication. Yet, in communication scenarios where various user subsets may be involved in different sessions the deployment of classical GKE protocols has clear performance and scalability limitations as each new session should be preceded by a separate execution of the protocol. The motivation of this work is to study the possibility of designing more flexible GKE protocols allowing not only the computation of a group key for some initial set of users but also efficient derivation of independent secret keys for all potential subsets. In particular we improve and generalize the recently introduced GKE protocols enabling on-demand derivation of peer-to-peer keys (so called GKE+P protocols). We show how a group of users can agree on a secret group key while obtaining some additional information that they can use on-demand to efficiently compute independent secret keys for any possible subgroup. Our security analysis relies on the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption and uses random oracles.

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Efficient group key management for secure big data in predictable large‐scale networks

Qin

et al. 2015

Concurrency and Computation

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SUMMARYIt is challenging to secure group communications among large-scale networks due to their network scale. We observe that in many large-scale networks, the scale of actual group communication is nevertheless predicable and not very large. For instance, although the entire social network (e.g., Facebook) may have billions of users, the members in a concrete group are usually about tens to hundreds. We manage to secure group communication in such scenarios with efficient group management protocols. Technically, we achieve this goal by using a novel dual-ring approach in which two rings of nodes are established, one active and one dummy. When some nodes leave, the remaining nodes can replace these nodes with dummy nodes, minimizing the required communications and computations after the protocol is set up and thus providing significant advantage over existing group key management protocols. Formal security arguments show that our protocols are secure under standard computational assumptions. Thorough analysis confirms that our protocols are efficient in computation and communication.

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Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Cited by 251 publications

References 28 publications

Identity-Based Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement Protocol

Identity-Based Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement Protocol

Flexible Group Key Exchange with On-demand Computation of Subgroup Keys

Efficient group key management for secure big data in predictable large‐scale networks

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