Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Abstract

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self‐determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.

Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on Risky Decision Making

“…Feedback could result in regret or rejoicing, thus their curiosity could be rewarded or punished. On average, however, our data indicated that anticipated regret weighs heavier than anticipated rejoicing (see also Beattie et al, 1994, andLarrick &.…”

“…This prediction is based on the finding that people are, in general, more influenced by negative information than by positive information (Taylor, 1991) and on Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) conclusion that losses loom larger than gains. Moreover, recent research by Beattie, Baron, Hershey, and Spranca (1994) found that while decisions are influenced by the anticipation of regret, there was no consistent support for the anticipation of rejoicing as a decision motive. Thus, for most individuals, in weighing regret and rejoicing, we expect the balance to be in favor of regret.…”

The use of crying over spilled milk: A note on the rationality and functionality of regret

“…First, we may avoid deciding as a consequence of anticipated regret (cf. Beattie et al, 1994). We can do this simply in order to avoid making the wrong decision.…”

“…Anticipations of these emotional reactions may in¯uence what we choose, which particular house, movie, or cash register, but also how we choose. That is, negative emotions may prompt us to delay decisions (Beattie et al, 1994) and in¯uence the amount and direction of pre-decisional information search (Luce, 1998). Thus, when making decisions we not only predict the utility that will be provided by these options, as assumed in rational choice theory, we also predict the emotions that arise from comparing the result of that option with the results of options forgone.…”

Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment

“…These emotions are more utilitarian, that is, they are more related to the hedonic value of decision outcomes or events. This presumably is why disappointment and (in particular) regret have attracted so much attention in research on individual decision-making (see e.g., Beattie et al, 1994;Bell, 1982Bell, , 1985Gull, 1991;Kelsey, á Schepanski, I991;Inman, Dyer, 8c Regrer und disuppoimnrenr 3 Jia, 1997;Inman, á McAlister, 1994;Janis á Mann, 1977;Josephs, Larrick, Steele, á Nisbett, 1992;Larrick, 8r. Boles, 1995;Loomes 8c Sugden, 1982, 1986, 1987Mellers, Schwartz, Ho,~Ritov, 1997;Richard, van der Plig[, á de Vries, 1996;Ritov, 1996;Ritov, 8c Baron, 1995;Taylor, 1997;van Dijk, 8c van der Pligt, 1997;Zeelenberg et al, I996;Zeelenberg, 8c Beattie, 1997;Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, óc Manstead, nt press).…”